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In his seminal article, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, Richard Stewart critiqued the modern administrative state's lack
of political accountability.' He described the "transmission belt"
model-legislative policymaking followed by agency execution, with
judicial review to ensure that agency actions closely hewed to congres-
sional dictates-as no longer operative, because of the reality that
Congress relies on broad delegations to agencies.
2 Stewart thus ques-
tioned the legitimacy of agency-level decisionmaking, which he argued
raises a host of issues for how bureaucrats could be made politically or
legally accountable.
3
Stewart observed, however, that "the example of taxation shows
that Congress is capable of gearing up for detailed legislation (and
frequent revision) if there are strong political incentives to do so 
.... ,4
This aside about tax law suggested that, because tax policy was
uniquely the province of Congress, his evaluation may have less bite
with regard to tax. But the insight has received little attention from
administrative law scholars, perhaps because the purportedly trans-
substantive procedures, practices, and norms of the administrative
state-the system that Stewart was flogging as ill-equipped for the
challenges of modem administration-have often not extended to tax
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1 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667 (1975).
2 Id. at 1675-76, 1684.
3 See generally id. at 1802-13.
4 Id. at 1695 n.127.
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administration. Rather, until recently, tax-specific administrative pro-
cedures, practices, norms, and precedents governing judicial review
have shaped tax administration.5
Then, in 2011, the Supreme Court made a significant move to assim-
ilate tax with the rest of the administrative state with its unanimous
opinion in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v.
United States.6 The Court stated that it was "not inclined to carve out
an approach to administrative review good for tax law only," absent
some "justification" for treating tax law differently than other areas of
law.7 The Court explained that its longstanding normative commit-
ments in judicial review of agency action-most prominently, to pro-
moting political accountability and deferring to agency experts-
"apply with full force in the tax context."' 8
Scholars and courts have taken Mayo as a mandate to end the era of
tax-specific administrative procedures, practices, and norms, of which
there are many. One study found that over 40% of Treasury rulemak-
ing projects sampled violated the Administrative Procedure Act's
(APA) notice-and-comment requirements.9 Even when Treasury did
engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking, 80% of proposed rules
were accompanied by an explicit assertion by Treasury that notice and
comment was not required under the APA.'0 Further, when Treasury
issues final regulations, it often does not provide the sort of detailed
5 See notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
6 562 U.S. 44 (2011) (Justice Kagan. did not participate in consideration of the case). In
Mayo, the Court applied the Chevron two-step analysis to hold that the statutory language
at issue did not directly address the question at hand, and then deferred to Treasury's
regulation as a "reasonable construction" of the statute. Id. at 60. The issue was whether
medical residents, for example, medical school graduates in training to become doctors, are
required to pay Social Security and Medicare taxes. Id. at 47. Congress enacted an excep-
tion for certain "students," but Treasury regulations provided that medical residents work-
ing full-time did not qualify for the student exception. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3).
7 Mayo, 562 U.S. at 55.
8 Id. at 45. More precisely, the Court provided that "the principles underlying Chevron
apply with full force in the tax context." Id. Chevron is predicated on keeping the judici-
ary out of policymaking, with the court explicitly providing that such decisionmaking
should be made by "either political branch of the Government" and not by nonpolitical
judiciary, and that Congress might appropriately rely on "those with great expertise and
charged with responsibility for administering the provision," rather than judges who are
not experts. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
9 Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1727, 1748-51 (2007) (finding that Treasury regularly defers notice and com-
ment on tax regulations until after a regulation has taken effect-36.2% of Treasury's tax
regulations were initially issued as temporary regulations, with notice and comment occur-
ring after the rule was already in effect, and another 4.7% were issued as final rules with-
out any notice and comment).
10 See id. at 1778. Treasury has regularly included the following disclaimer in its pream-
bles: "It has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5
U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to this regulation." See, e.g., T.D. 9782, 2016-36 I.R.B.
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explanation of its reasoning, nor the sort of responses to comments
received, that have become the norm for agencies that have been reg-
ularly subject to judicial review under State Farm.1 Rather, the pre-
ambles for final tax rules often have an instructional tone and are
mostly explanatory, nothing like the sort of adversarial prelitigation
document that is familiar in other rulemaking contexts.'
2
But focusing on the mechanics of procedures and processes in the
tax rulemaking process elides the normative considerations that the
Supreme Court expressly emphasized in Mayo-political accountabil-
ity, and deference to agency expertise. With these principles in mind,
this Article returns to a question that Richard Stewart hinted at in
1975: Does the behavior of Congress, the wellspring of substantive
authority for all agency actions, distinguish tax law from other areas of
law in a way that is relevant for our conception of how the tax system
should interact with general administrative law, doctrinally and
normatively?
This Article claims that Congress controls tax rulemaking to an
unappreciated extent, and in a manner that often makes tax rulemak-
ing distinct from the sort of broad congressional delegation to agency
decisionmakers that has come to typify the modern administrative
state in scholarship and case law. I argue that this "congressional con-
trol" model of tax rulemaking promotes political accountability and
reliance on expertise, as well as taxpayer certainty, which is an espe-
cially valued attribute for tax policy. As such, I argue that congres-
sional control of tax rulemaking should be embraced-not because
tax law or tax administration should be kept separate from the doc-
trine and principles that constitute administrative law more generally,
but rather because congressional control highlights features of tax
rulemaking that are relevant for fitting general administrative law to
tax law in a way that achieves common normative goals.
As part of the argument in support of congressional control, this
Article makes two descriptive contributions to scholars' and courts'
consideration of how tax regulations are produced. First, I show that
Congress has special institutional capacity-in the form of the Joint
301, 305. See generally Hickman, note 9, at 1778-86 (explaining and critiquing this
practice).
11 Motor Vehicle Mfrs Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 403 U.S. 29
(1983); see Patrick J. Smith, The APA's Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and IRS Regu-
lations, 136 Tax Notes 271, 274-75 (July 16, 2012) (noting that the Internal Revenue Man-
ual included an explicit statement that preambles to tax regulations need not justify rules
or describe what alternatives were considered, which is incongruous with the requirements
of State Farm; the statement has since been removed).
12 See Daniel Shaviro, The Farce of "Arm's Length" Transfer Pricing and "Cost Shar-
ing," Start Making Sense Blog (Oct. 5, 2015, 12:09 PM), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/
2015/10/the-ludicrous-farce-of-arms-length.html.
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Committee on Taxation (JCT)-that allows Congress to enact tax leg-
islation that consists of detailed statutory directives that can leave few
issues to be resolved by Treasury.13 These detailed tax statutes are
often accompanied by legislative history that explicitly directs the sub-
stance of tax regulations.14 I make the case that these products of the
tax legislative process often limit Treasury's policymaking discretion,
and I detail instances of this sort of limited delegation.15
Second, I show that the notice-and-comment process for regula-
tions, which is a mechanism for establishing political accountability as
a check on agency decisionmaking, has been generally ineffective for
this purpose with tax regulations. I survey three years of recently pro-
posed tax regulations and show that there has been very close to zero
participation in most notice-and-comment processes-fully one-third
of the time, no one participated. Further, I show that the few partici-
pants have been heavily weighted towards private interests, often so-
phisticated business taxpayers seeking to reduce tax liability in ways
that were wholly predictable and anticipated when Congress ad-
dressed the issue, while public interest groups are mostly absent from
the process. Private interests-for example, business taxpayer organi-
zations and their representatives-commented on approximately two-
thirds of all proposed regulations from 2013 through 2015. In con-
trast, public interest groups commented on less than 24% of proposed
regulations.16 While a few proposed regulations appeared to garner
extensive attention from public and private interests, in most cases
with run-of-the-mill regulations, private interests far exceeded public
interests, with an average of over seven comments per regulation for
private interests versus just over one comment per regulation for pub-
lic interest groups, and a median number of comments of 2.5 per regu-
lation for private interests and zero for private interests.17
Of course, lopsided notice-and-comment processes exist in various
contexts, and Congress can always enact detailed statutes and produce
legislative history that instructs an implementing agency how to pro-
ceed. This Article focuses attention on the special capacity that Con-
gress has developed that allows it to regularly produce tax legislation
in this manner.
13 See Subsection III.A.1.
14 See Subsection III.A.3.
15 This Article uses the phrase "highly constrained delegation" to describe delegations
of authority from Congress to Treasury that limit the policymaking discretion given to
Treasury personnel, as described further in subsection III.A.1. The opposite of a highly
constrained delegation is a broad delegation that provides significant policymaking discre-
tion to agency personnel. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
16 See notes 188-85 and accompanying text.
17 See Table 2.
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The central institutional arrangement that facilitates congressional
control is that tax legislation is produced under the watchful eye of the
JCT. The JCT is a singular congressional institution: bicameral, non-
partisan, with a staff of lawyers and economists whose expertise facili-
tates almost every delegation of authority in the Code. The JCT staff
assists with devising and drafting legislation, and, importantly, pro-
duces revenue estimates of every tax provision and prepares explana-
tions of revenue-raising legislative proposals that Congress relies on
throughout the legislative process.
18 These explanations inform legis-
lators and become the legislative history that directs the substance of
many tax regulations. Through these and other activities, the JCT
contributes to what this Article calls "pre-emptive gap-filling" by Con-
gress, filling the sort of gaps that typically are delegated to agency
personnel and that can provide fertile ground for APA-based chal-
lenges in other substantive areas of law. By making clear how tax
provisions should be constructed, and addressing the minutiae of tax
rules, detailed tax statutes and legislative history enhance Congress'
accountability for subsequent ax regulations while also making room
for expertise to come to bear on the design of tax rules. Thus, the
institutional arrangements and practices detailed here are precisely
the type that courts look for agencies to apply in the regulation-writing
process.
The congressional control model of tax rulemaking presented here
may complicate the debate between anti-tax exceptionalists who have
pushed for tax administration to conform to general administrative
law procedures and norms, and (pro-)tax exceptionalists who have de-
fended existing Treasury and IRS practices on the grounds that tax
administration is different than other contexts for contemplating ad-
ministrative law. The congressional control model may provide a mid-
dle ground: Tax is, in some instances, different than other areas of law
in a way that is relevant for consideration of how to achieve the nor-
mative goals of administrative law. Moreover, the focus on Congress
suggested in this Article connects tax law with a long-running debate
on statutory construction. This Article proposes that Treasury, the
IRS, and courts should give greater attention to the intricacies of the
legislative process, and proposes a new presumption in the interpreta-
tion of tax statutes, the "JCT Canon." The JCT Canon would direct
that regulation-writers and courts, when confronted with an ambigu-
ous statutory provision, should follow the construction adopted by the
JCT for its revenue estimates and in its explanations of statutory pro-
visions. Indeed, this is most often already the accepted practice within
Treasury, which frequently coordinates with the JCT staff. Explicit
18 See Subsection III.A.1.
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use of the JCT Canon by courts would create consistency across ad-
ministrative and judicial interpretation and bolster the taxpayer-cer-
tainty benefits of congressional control, which is especially important
in a system of self-assessment.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the general re-
quirements for rulemaking prescribed by the APA and related judicial
doctrines, and how those conventions were applied to tax rulemaking
prior to Mayo. This Part also describes scholars' and courts' norma-
tive commitments to political accountability and reliance on expertise
in agency policymaking. Part III introduces the congressional control
model of tax rulemaking, and argues that congressional control of tax
rulemaking promotes rules that are the product of relevant expertise,
and facilitates political accountability. Part IV provides the results of
an original survey of the notice-and-comment process for tax rulemak-
ing, based on a review of participants in the notice-and-comment
processes for proposed tax regulations from 2013 through 2015. Part
V introduces the JCT Canon, and explores the implications of con-
gressional control tax administration in the wake of Mayo. Part VI
concludes.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND TAx RULEMAKING
Tax administration developed separately and independently from
the general administrative law, at least in part because the system of
tax administration developed long before the APA was enacted in
1946.19 Nonetheless, the modem administrative state and federal
rulemaking practices can be traced back to the earliest workings of the
federal tax system, when Alexander Hamilton directed tax collection
through a variety of missives to tax collectors and taxpayers across the
country.20 These "instructions and rulings" from the 1790's are "the
predecessors of the thousands of pages of IRS regulations and reve-
nue rulings with which every modern tax attorney is familiar. ' 21 Even
the Treasury's regulation-writing function has a long history-in 1917,
19 See Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 63 Duke L.J. 1673 (2014) (reviewing the development of tax administration
before the APA).
20 Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred
Years of American Administrative Law 56 (2012). Gillian Metzger summarized the history
of tax administration in her investigation of the pre-twentieth century administrative state,
and noted tax administration's deep roots: "The Treasury Department was a major hub of
early federal administration, with Alexander Hamilton crafting the first iterations of fed-
eral administrative law in his oversight of revenue generation and customs collection."
Gillian Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Rela-
tionship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 Law & Contemp.
Probs. no. 3, 2015, at 129.
21 Mashaw, note 20, at 56.
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shortly after the income tax was first enacted, Congress provided
grants of regulatory authority to Treasury that have continued in the
statute ever since.
22
This Part focuses on agency rulemaking, first describing the proce-
dures and requirements for rulemaking in general, which are imposed
by the APA and judicial doctrine, and corresponding tax-specific rules
and precedents. Second, this Part discusses the normative underpin-
nings of these procedures and requirements, which focus on accounta-
bility and deference to agency experts.
A. Doctrine
The APA generally requires that regulations be adopted in accor-
dance with so-called informal "rulemaking" procedures.
23 This con-
sists of a three-step process: (1) The agency must provide notice of
the proposed rule; (2) the agency must accept comments from the gen-
eral public on the proposed rule; and, (3) agency personnel must con-
sider the comments in finalizing the rule and include with the final
rule a "concise general statement" of the basis for the rule.
24
Regulations that are adopted via this three-step notice-and-com-
ment process can carry the "force of law," meaning that these rules
are legally binding on regulated parties.25 Such legally binding rules
that are adopted via the notice-and-comment process may, if chal-
lenged under the APA, receive Chevron deference from a reviewing
court.26 Under Chevron, courts defer to agency rules that fall within
22 War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 62-254, § 1005, 40 Stat. 300, 326; Thomas W.
Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Con-
vention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 571 (2002) (discussing grants of regulatory authority in the
1917 Act, and similarities and continuity with current Code delegations).
23 Informal rulemaking procedures are distinguished from the so-called formal rulemak-
ing procedures, which may be required by Congress and which must include an on-the-
record evidentiary hearing. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 556 (2012). Formal rulemaking must be
supported by "substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
24 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2012). The APA requires that a final rule must be published at
least thirty days before its effective date. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2012); see also Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 7.1, at 557 (2d ed. 2010).
25 See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 476-77
(2013). Rules that carry the force of law are sometimes deemed "legislative" rules whereas
rules that do not carry the force of law are referred to as "interpretive" rules. Id. at 473,
473 n.26. There is ambiguity as to precisely what "force of law" means, and the meaning
may be contextual, but the central inquiries are whether there is "evidence of a congres-
sional delegation of power to act with legal force" and whether there is "agency intent to
utilize that authority." Id. at 510. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-35
(2001).
26 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. An agency's adherence to the procedures established by
the APA and the elaborations on those procedures established by courts generally can be
challenged in court under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (2012). A procedurally
invalid agency action cannot qualify for Chevron deference. Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
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the authority delegated by Congress, and that are otherwise reasona-
ble, even if the court could determine there is a better policy or an
alternative construction of the authorizing statute.27
If the preceding paragraphs were the whole story, agency regula-
tions and judicial challenges to those regulations would be quite com-
plex. There is, however, play in each joint: how precisely the APA
dictates are satisfied, whether a rule carries the force of law, whether
Chevron deference is warranted, and whether or not a challenged reg-
ulation should be upheld by a court. And the story is actually much
more complex, especially with tax regulations.
First, although Chevron is ubiquitous in judicial review of regula-
tions, courts have applied it inconsistently,28 and the precise nature
and scope of the Chevron inquiry is often ambiguous. There is ongo-
ing back-and-forth among academics and in the courts about how to
apply Chevron-both "step one," which questions whether the regula-
tion falls within the statutory grant of authority, and "step two," under
which courts determine whether the regulation is reasonable.29
Most recently courts have started to integrate another important
aspect of judicial review of regulations, State Farm "hard look" re-
view, into the Chevron inquiry.30 Under State Farm, an agency must
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (Chevron deference is "not warranted" where "the
agency errs by failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.").
27 Chevron involves a two-step analytical process for courts to determine whether to
uphold an agency regulation. The first step consists of determining whether Congress has
addressed the "precise question at issue." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). If it has, then the agency and the court are bound by
Congress' mandate. Id. If the statute is ambiguous, step two consists of the court deter-
mining whether the agency's decision is reasonable. If it is, then the court will defer to the
agency. Id. at 843.
28 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 Mich.
L. Rev. 1 (2017).
29 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step,
95 Va. L. Rev. 593 (2009) (criticizing Chevron for artificially dividing one inquiry into two
steps); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron's Two Steps, 95 Va. L. Rev. 611
(2009) (defending Chevron's two-step analysis against Stephenson & Vermeule, supra);
Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1867 (2015) (ar-
guing that Chevron is a self-regulating doctrine that appropriately allocates decisionmaking
responsibility among the three branches).
30 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); see, e.g., Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2127; Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135
S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015); Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 422 F.2d
671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J.) (originating the phrase "hard look" to describe
the court's review of agency decisionmaking). Courts and scholars are currently deliberat-
ing whether and the extent to which Chevron should require agencies to satisfy State Farm.
The Supreme Court suggested that Chevron step two requires satisfying State Farm. Judu-
lang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011); Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2127. The Tax
Court adopted this position in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 91, 116-20 (2015),
appeal docketed, Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2016) (discussed in notes 45-49
and accompanying text).
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engage in "reasoned decision making," which demands that agency
personnel "examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory ex-
planation" for the agency action.31 The agency's explanation of the
rule must show that it considered the "relevant factors" intended by
Congress.32 To adequately explain its rationale and reasoning, the
APA-required "concise general statement," most often must be de-
tailed and thorough.33 The Supreme Court has signaled that hard
look review should be part of a court's review for Chevron defer-
ence-meaning that judicial deference may be predicated on agency
action conforming to the reasoned decisionmaking standard.34 But it
is unclear how, exactly, State Farm fits into Chevron.35 This melding
of doctrines has already started to unsettle the tax regulatory world,
with the Tax Court holding that an important regulation on transfer
pricing is invalid under State Farm, even though that regulation may
well have been reasonable under a less expansive Chevron step two
analysis.
36
Second, additional complexity exists for prospectively applying
these rules to tax regulations, because there is little precedent for
courts to look to when applying this murky doctrine to tax rules and
procedures.37 For decades prior to Mayo, courts often followed the
Supreme Court's tax-specific National Muffler opinion to determine
whether or not to defer to Treasury's tax regulations.38 But that pre-
cedent provided a convoluted set of factors that proved problematic
for the courts: Judges did not always apply the National Muffler fac-
tors, and when they did, it was a fountainhead of inconsistent jurispru-
31 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines Inc. v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
32 Id.
33 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
Tulsa L.J. 185, 192-93 (1996).
34 Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2127; Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706.
35 Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron J. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 757, 781 (2017); see also Kristin E. Hickman & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative
Law Treatise 29-31 (Supp. 2017).
36 Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 91, 133 (2015), appeal docketed, Nos. 16-
70496, 16-70497 (9th Cir., argued on Oct. 11, 2017).
37 See generally Camp, note 19, at 1684 (The movement to assimilate tax administrative
doctrine risks "distorting the proper relationship between tax administration and general
administrative-law principles. . . . An understanding of that history is necessary for a
proper understanding of the relationship between administrative law and tax.").
38 See Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). Mayo
makes clear that National Muffler is no longer relevant for determining what sort of defer-
ence tax regulations should receive; rather, the general precedents Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944), should apply. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562
U.S. 44 (2011). Skidmore provides for varying degrees of deference for "interpretative"
rules depending on the persuasiveness of the rule. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see generally
Pierce, note 24, at 442-47.
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dence.39 Further, review of tax regulations is often presented to
courts in a different posture than typical APA-based challenges to reg-
ulations: The Tax Anti-Injunction Act generally prohibits pre-en-
forcement review of tax regulations.40 This means that even
procedural challenges to tax regulations can only emerge in the courts
in connection with an actual taxpayer's specific dispute, and only once
that taxpayer has concluded the administrative review (audit) process
and decided to challenge an IRS determination in Tax Court or fed-
eral District Court. Among other effects, this creates significant lag
time between the promulgation of a regulation and the opportunity
for courts to review the substance of the regulations or the procedures
used to produce the regulation.
41
The Mayo opinion and the move to integrate State Farm with Chev-
ron are making procedural challenges to tax regulations especially at-
tractive to taxpayers. Taxpayers have started to cite Mayo when
challenging perceived procedural deficiencies in Treasury's rulemak-
ing practices. One of the most significant court opinions applying
Mayo is Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, decided in the Tax Court and
currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.42 The Tax Court held en
39 For example, before the Supreme Court's opinion in Mayo, the same substantive issue
arose in various federal district courts; some judges in those courts cited National Muffler,
others cited Chevron, and others cited neither case. See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ.
& Research v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170-71 (D. Minn. 2007) (citing Na-
tional Muffler), rev'd, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009); Univ. of Chicago Hosp. v. United
States, 2006 WL 2631974 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citing Chevron), aff'd, 545 F.3d 564 (7th Cir.
2008); United States v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 2006 WL 3497312 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (citing
neither), affd in part, vacated in part, 557 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2009). As one scholar summa-
rized prior to Mayo, the "disparate approaches to tax deference are consistent... in their
insistence that, whatever Chevron may mean for other areas of the law, tax is different and
should be treated thus." Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Excep-
tionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537, 1563 (2006).
40 IRC § 7421(a); see Florida Bankers Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065
(D.C. 2015) (holding that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act barred a challenge to a reporting
requirement imposed by regulation because violation of the regulation subjected the re-
porting agent to a penalty; to sustain the challenge, the reporting agent would have to
abstain from the requirement, pay a penalty, and then sue for refund). But see Direct
Mktg. Association v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015) (narrowly construing the Tax Injunction
Act, which is similar to the Anti-Injunction Act but which applies to state tax provisions).
41 For example, the regulation at issue in Altera was finalized in 2003, and the litigation,
which yielded a Tax Court opinion in 2015, concerned Altera's 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007
taxable years. Altera, 145 T.C. at 94. In part because of this long lag time, taxpayers have
not often mounted procedural challenges to tax regulations, and the Tax Court is particu-
larly inexperienced in handling procedural challenges. See Hickman, note 5, at 1764-65.
For example, as of this writing, the Tax Court has cited State Farm in just eleven opinions
(including both Tax Court reported decisions and Tax Court Memorandum Decisions), and
four of those instances have occurred in the past two years.
42 Altera, 145 T.C. 91.
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banc that an anti-abuse regulation issued by Treasury43 was invalid
because Treasury failed to meet the requirements of State Farm, that
is, Treasury did not engage in a "reasoned decisionmaking" process
and failed to respond adequately to comments submitted during the
notice-and-comment process." The regulation at issue in Altera re-
ceived comments solely from sophisticated taxpayers facing significant
tax liability under the proposed rule; no parties with broader or con-
trary interests participated in the notice-and-comment process.
45
Consequently, when Treasury proceeded to finalize the rule-in the
same form as originally proposed, despite the comments and informa-
tion it received from taxpayers-Treasury appeared to be disregarding
a consensus in opposition to the rule.4 6 Notably for the arguments
presented in this Article, the Tax Court in Altera largely dismissed the
possibility that Congress may have mandated the substance of the reg-
ulation at issue by way of legislative history published by the JCT that
accompanied the relevant statutory provision; as discussed below, the
court may have come to a different conclusion if it had afforded
greater weight to legislative history.47 These developments-Mayo
and the introduction of hard look review-are of particular concern
for the stability of tax administration, because if applied retrospec-
tively, they could make almost all past tax regulations appear to be
procedurally deficient because they were uniformly drafted and
promulgated without consideration of hard look review.4 8 And this is
potentially problematic for the fisc, because it could hamper revenue-
collection efforts that are based on practices that were, until recently,
widely seen as settled and uncontroversial.
Thus, scholars and courts are now grappling with how tax adminis-
tration should conform to the requirements of the APA and related
43 The regulation was issued to carry out § 482, which provides the IRS with authority to
"distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances" be-
tween two related organizations (for example, a parent corporation and its subsidiary) in
order to "prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions," and also provides that for transactions involving the transfer or license of intangible
property, "the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with
the income attributable to the intangible." IRC § 482; Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(2).
44 Altera, 145 T.C. at 133.
45 As discussed in Section IV, sophisticated taxpayers dominate the notice-and-com-
ment processes for tax rulemaking.
46 In concluding that Treasury violated State Farm's reasoned decisionmaking standard,
the Tax Court held that the regulation Treasury adopted ran "contrary to all of the evi-
dence before it." Altera, 145 T.C. at 133.
47 See notes 148-52 and accompanying text (describing legislative history that directly
addressed the issue in the Altera litigation); see also Section IV.A. (discussing the implica-
tions of the arguments in this Article for judicial review under State Farm).
48 Hickman, note 25, at 471 (acknowledging "significant potential difficulties for the sta-
bility of the federal income tax system" based on doctrinal analysis under general adminis-
trative law).
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judicial doctrine. Some scholars-who oppose tax exceptionalism in
administrative law-have focused on specific requirements of general
administrative law that Treasury has arguably failed to satisfy.
49
Other scholars-defending tax exceptionalism, at least in part-have
offered pragmatic defenses of existing Treasury rulemaking practices,
arguing that the APA and related judicial doctrine should be reformed
post-Mayo to reflect special administrative demands of tax
rulemaking.50
B. Normative Aspirations
Reactions to Mayo often have not featured normative goals. Ad-
ministrative law generally, and rulemaking in particular, is focused on
political accountability-it is described as the "obsession" of adminis-
trative law,51 and it animates the rules and judicial doctrine described
in the previous Section.52 The basic precept of political accountability
49 See e.g., Amandeep S. Grewal, Mixing Management Fee Waiver with Mayo, 16 Fla.
Tax Rev. 1 (2014) (critiquing "phantom regulations," that is, regulations that Congress has
instructed Treasury to issue, but that Treasury has not yet promulgated); Hickman, note 25,
at 492-98, 502-09, 530-31; Kristin E. Hickman & Mark Thomson, Open Minds and Harm-
less Errors: Judicial Review of Post-Promulgation Notice and Comment, 101 Cornell L.
Rev. 261, 308 (2016); Kristin E. Hickman, The Promise and the Reality of U.S. Tax Admin-
istration, in The Delicate Balance: Tax, Discretion and the Rule of Law 471 (Chris Evans,
Judith Freedman & Richard Krever eds., 2011) (arguing that some sub-regulatory guidance
has the force of law and should be subject to notice and comment, and that more Treasury
and IRS procedures should be subject to pre-enforcement judicial review).
50 See, e.g., Stephanie Hunter McMahon, The Perfect Process Is the Enemy of the Good
Tax: Tax's Exceptional Regulatory Process, 35 Va. Tax Rev. 553, 580, 585-86 (2016) (dis-
cussing ossification and capture); Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax
Exceptionalism, 64 Duke L.J. Online 21, 23, 35 (2014) (urging courts to "give weight to
tax's particular history and needs in order to justify a generous, flexible approach to" the
extent to which standard notice-and-comment procedures must apply to tax regulations);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution Should Determine Whether an Agency's Explana-
tion of a Tax Decision Is Adequate?: A Response to Steve Johnson, 64 Duke L.J. Online
1, 12-18 (2014) (discussing ossification); James M. Puckett, Structural Tax Exceptionalism,
49 Ga. L. Rev. 1067, 1090 (2015) (arguing that certain administrative provisions of the
Code supplant APA procedures); Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After
All?, 63 Duke L.J. 1897 (2014) (mounting a limited defense of tax exceptionalism).
51 Metzger, note 20, at 130; see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Admin-
istrative Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1751 (2007).
52 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) ,
Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 50-51 (2006);
Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 Yale L.J.
1395, 1413-14 (1975); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 505, 523 (1985); Mashaw, note 20, at 10 ("[T]he recognition that agencies are also
monitored and instructed by political principals, runs like a leitmotif through contempo-
rary judicial opinions review."); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Wein-
gast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. Econ. & Org.
243, 243, 246 (1987); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory
in Administrative Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 520 (1985) ("Policy decisions should be made
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is that policy should be set by "political principals," and these princi-
pals direct actions taken by otherwise unaccountable personnel, for
example agency bureaucrats.5 3 Political accountability works through
the ballot box as "voters reward elected officials for good records by
voting for them, and punish officials for bad records by voting against
them."' 54 At a very abstract level, sufficient political accountability for
agency actions will ensure that "democratic will is effectively
implemented."55
Of course, this conception of accountability leaves many ques-
tions-what is democratic will, how is it expressed, how do political
principals translate that will into policy, and so on-and many unsatis-
factory answers.5 6 There are various conceptions as to what type and
degree of control by political principals is necessary to make agency
decisionmakers sufficiently politically accountable.5 7 I set aside these
many underlying issues for the purposes of this Article and, for now,
accept the Supreme Court's (contestable) premise that political ac-
countability is achieved when policymaking discretion lies in a politi-
cal branch (that is the executive branch or the legislative branch) and
by the most politically accountable institution available."); Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrele-
vance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 141, 149 (2012)
("[O]ne role of hard-look review is to facilitate political accountability by demanding that
an agency make manifest the trade-offs generated by its rulemaking."); Cass R. Sunstein,
Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 976, 986-87 (1982).
53 Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a "Dense Complexity": Accountability and the Project
of Administrative Law, Issues in Legal Scholarship, no. 4, 2005, at 1, 16-21; Jerry L.
Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of
Legal Development, 6 J. L. Econ. & Org. 267, 279-84 (1990).
54 Nicholas 0. Stephanopolous, Discounting Accountability, An Elective Perspective:
Judicial Regulation of Politics in an Election Year 8 (Kentucky L.J., Election Law Sympo-
sium (Mar. 2016)), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload-documents/16 0_10
%20Nicholas%2StephanopoulosDiscounting%2OAccountability.pdf.
55 Mashaw, note 20, at 8. This suggests that "the policy the bureaucracy implements"
should be "the policy that a majority of the electorate would select if the issue were put to
a vote." Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 Mich.
L. Rev. 53, 65 (2008).
56 See Stephanopolous, note 54, at 17-26 (critiquing various mechanisms the Supreme
Court has relied on to achieve political accountability).
57 See, e.g., Bressman, note 51, at 1751; Bressman & Vandenbergh, note 52, at 51
("[W]hether an elected official supervises agency decision making" is a key element of
political accountability); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
2245, 2332 (2001); Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on
"Inside the Administrative State," 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1497, 1504 (2007) (critiquing one
formulation of political accountability as demanding responsiveness, transparency, and
substantive outcomes that "represent[ ] public preferences and resist[ ] factions or paro-
chial pressures"); Metzger, note 20, at 130; Stephenson, note 55, at 57 ("[M]uch of the
existing literature advocating extensive political control of the bureaucracy" accepts "that
majoritarianism is a legitimate and coherent institutional goal.").
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
the decisionmaker acts at the direction of an elected official (that is,
the President or members of Congress).
58
This sort of conception of political accountability has given rise to
various related and subsidiary normative goals that have become
hallmarks of administrative law jurisprudence and academic litera-
ture. In order for decision-makers to be held politically accountable,
the public must be able to discern who the decisionmakers are and
what decisions they have made, that is, decisionmaking and control
must be transparent.5 9 Similarly, accountability suggests the impor-
tant rule-of-law constraints on agency action: Agency personnel
should act only when granted power to do so, which can be checked
through public notice that power has been granted, and public expla-
nations when power is exercised.
60
Historically, Congress was considered to be the primary political
principal involved in the rulemaking process. In Stewart's transmis-
sion belt model, Congress acts through legislation to direct agency ac-
tions, and agency actions are subject to review by courts to ensure
agencies adhere to congressional commands.61 But, as identified by
Stewart, that model fell apart with the rise of the modern administra-
tive state, typified by broad delegations of authority from Congress to
agencies that place minimal constraints on agency action.62 Accounta-
bility derived from Congress is lacking when congressional delega-
tions give agency personnel expansive policymaking discretion,
perhaps even by enacting "empty standard[s]" that are "literally
meaningless.' 63 Legislation taking this approach might direct an
agency to adopt "reasonable" regulatory policies. For example, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is required to establish "just
and reasonable" rates for natural gas pipelines, but "'just and reason-
able' describes any result the agency can explain."64 These sorts of
58 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984);
Kagan, note 57, at 2332 (describing a "link" between administrators and the voting public
through the President).
59 See Kagan, note 57, at 2332.
60 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 496 (2003); Kevin M. Stack, An Adminis-
trative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
1985, 1992-93 (2015) (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 46-90 (rev. ed. 1969)).
61 Stewart, note 1, at 1672-76.
62 Id. at 1681-84.
63 Pierce, note 24, § 2.6, at 100. Pierce describes other ways that Congress delegates
without constraint as well, including enacting "unranked decisional goals," and enacting
"contradictory standards." Id. § 2.6, at 99-100.
64 Id. § 2.6, at 100. This standard was subsequently replaced by an equally vacuous stan-
dard requiring that rates be "fair and equitable." See id. § 2.6, at 101. A recent Supreme
Court opinion illustrates another empty standard. In City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S.
290 (2013), the Court reviewed regulations issued by the Federal Communications Com-
mission under a statutory mandate to grant broadcast licenses "if public convenience, in-
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broad delegations have become a regular and accepted feature of the
modern administrative state.
65
There are various mechanisms for establishing accountability that
are available to supplement, or perhaps replace, the mechanisms
found in the transmission belt model. Under the presidential adminis-
tration model, the President directs agency actions, taking policymak-
ing responsibility where Congress makes broad delegations that
appear to leave agencies unaccountable.66 Another set of alternatives,
the interest group models, envision procedural constraints on agency
actions that foster pluralistic deliberations to guide agency deci-
sionmakers.67 This, in turn, stimulates direct accountability by agen-
cies to parties that are affected by agency decisionmaking, thus
supplementing oversight from political principals. Similarly, reliance
on agency expertise may be seen as consistent with political accounta-
terest, or necessity will be served thereby," 47 U.S.C. § 307(a), requiring action "within a
reasonable period of time," 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), and using general regulatory au-
thority to issue "such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest," 47
U.S.C. § 201(b).
65 E.g., Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of Regu-
latory Costs, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1994, at 127, 137 ("Broad and vague delega-
tions of rulemaking power to agencies are an inevitable part of modern political life.");
McCubbins et al., note 52, at 272 ("[L]egislation typically delegates to agencies vague man-
dates accompanied by broad grants of authority to the agency to define the 'public inter-
est."'). The Supreme Court has not demanded more as a matter of constitutional law,
requiring only that delegations be guided by an "intelligible principle." Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Scholars generally agree that this requirement does little
to limit the breadth of congressional delegations. See Bressman, note 60, at 517.
66 See James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President:
An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 Duke L.J. 851, 863-64 (2001);
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L.
Rev. 23, 83-86 (1995); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Re-
view of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1075-76 (1986); Kagan, note 57, at
2332; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 97-99 (1994); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 965, 967-69 (1997). Although the presidential administration model is dominant
among contemporary scholars, it is also contested. See, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh,
note 52, at 50, 69, 83 (concluding that White House oversight is "unsystematic" and does
not appear linked to preferences of the national electorate); Thomas 0. McGarity, Admin-
istrative Law as Bloodsport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L.J. 1671,
1679-82 (2012) (describing the influence of regulated parties as at times overpowering pres-
idential oversight).
67 See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1997); Garland, note 52, at 510; Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in
Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 359-61 (1972); Sunstein, note 52, at 986-87
(stating that participation in agency decisionmaking processes is important "to promote
political accountability by producing policies that correspond to the will of the public as a
whole."). But see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1514-15, 1559-62 (1992) (advocating for public input in
agency decisionmaking so that it is "informed by the values of the entire polity" but ex-
pressing skepticism about the effectiveness of the notice-and-comment process).
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bility by way of Congress: Agency personnel, given an "ascertainable
goal" by Congress, determine which policy option fits to the objec-
tively relevant facts, which, it is argued, makes agency discretion
"more apparent than real."'68
Nonetheless, when congressional delegations do not strictly limit
agency discretion, policy may be set in ways that are not responsive
to-or do not act with appreciation of responses from-the body poli-
tic or affected parties. In the tax context in particular, political ac-
countability is important but it is not clear how it is best established.69
Richard Pierce has advocated for presidential oversight of tax regula-
tions to provide greater political accountability and more consistent
oversight than judicial review,70 notwithstanding the fact that over-
sight of tax regulations has been a rarity.71 Kristin Hickman and
others have advocated greater deference for Treasury regulations,
with the aim of reducing judicial intervention in tax policy. 72 Political
accountability and reliance on expertise emerge in Hickman's argu-
ment in that "Treasury officials are more democratically accountable,
are better positioned to respond through regulations to changes in
taxpayer behavior and tax policy trends, and possess significantly
more expertise over the complexities of tax laws than most judges.'73
But on the other hand, Hickman has argued that if there is no notice-
and-comment process for tax regulations, it raises the concern that
"too much independence on the part of unelected agency representa-
68 Stewart, note 1, at 1678.
69 See notes 167-70 and accompanying text. James Hines and Kyle Logue have argued
that Congress should insulate tax policy from political winds by making broader delega-
tions of taxing authority. James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 Mich.
L. Rev. 235, 238 (2015) (suggesting broad delegation of tax policymaking authority to an
independent agency, like the Federal Reserve).
70 See Pierce, note 50, at 12-18 (suggesting Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs (OIRA) oversight as an alternative to judicial review and arguing that existing limita-
tions on judicial review of tax regulations make tax regulations well-suited to his proposal).
Daniel Hemel argues that presidential power to raise revenue unilaterally is strengthened
by the promise that courts will review Treasury actions under Mayo. Daniel J. Hemel, The
President's Power to Tax, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 633, 644 (2017).
71 Since 1983, there has been an agreement in place between the Office of Management
and Budget and Treasury limiting OIRA oversight of most tax regulations. Memorandum
of Agreement: Treasury and OMB Implementation of Executive Order 12291 (Apr. 29,
1983), https://www.treasury.gov/FOIAJDocuments/OMB %20MOA%2083-93.pdf.
72 See e.g., Hickman, note 39, at 1542.
73 Id. On the other hand, Steve Johnson has expressed concern that judicial deference
in the tax rulemaking context could give Treasury administrators a "carte blanche to adopt
their own policy preferences under the guise of rulemaking," without limits on their discre-
tion. Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 Va.
Tax Rev. 269, 297 (2012) (quoting Jeremiah Coder, IRS Official Explains, Defends
Rulemaking Process, 134 Tax Notes 1229, 1230 (Mar. 5, 2012)).
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tives threatens the ideal of democratic representation.
' 74 As explored
in Part IV, the notice-and-comment process for tax regulations often
falls short of the archetype that is defended in other contexts. The
challenge of establishing political accountability in tax rulemaking re-
mains very much unresolved.
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL MODEL OF TAX RULEMAKING
As the previous Part illustrates, political accountability, incorporat-
ing reliance on expertise, is an important goal underlying the APA
and judicial review doctrine, and there are concerns that tax rulemak-
ing, by failing to follow standard procedures, may compromise these
goals. This Part responds to these concerns, introducing the congres-
sional control model of tax rulemaking. This Part argues that the role
of Congress has been elided in consideration of how tax regulations
can achieve the goals of general administrative law.
Section A describes the congressional control model: Congress is
able to control tax rulemaking through detailed statutes and explicit
legislative history. Although these mechanisms may be available to
Congress in other contexts, this Section argues that Congress is able to
control tax rulemaking because it has established unique institutional
capacity and expertise-in the JTC staff and in practices and norms
surrounding tax legislation-that are brought to bear on tax legisla-
tion and the accompanying legislative history.
75 Section B argues that
congressional control of tax rulemaking should satisfy administrative
law's demand for political accountability, and also argues that con-
74 Hickman & Thomson, note 49, at 308 ("Providing for direct, meaningful public in-
volvement through prepromulgation notice and comment procedures inserts an element of
democracy into the rulemaking process and thereby legitimates resulting rules.").
75 Other mechanisms for congressional control, which are available to Congress with
regard to tax and other areas of law, include direct advocacy to influence regulatory
agenda-setting and policy decisions, and setting agency structure and procedures. See gen-
erally Bressman, note 51 (summarizing and integrating the contributions of positive politi-
cal theory scholars, who have focused on congressional use of administrative procedures as
means to influence agency action); McCubbins et al., note 52 (presenting procedural re-
quirements imposed on agencies by Congress as producing satisfactory substantive out-
comes similar to what Congress can achieve by imposing substantive constraints); Matthew
D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 Va. L. Rev.
431 (1989) (advancing the discussion of procedural requirements leading agencies to make
decisions consistent with congressional preferences). In addition to the mechanisms de-
scribed above, scholars have debated various ex post mechanisms that Congress can use to
influence agencies, including oversight (hearings and investigations) and the threat of cut-
ting funding. Compare JR. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to
Control Delegated Power, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1443, 1456 (2003) (summarizing ex post methods
of control), with McCubbins et al., supra, at 433 (reviewing ex post methods and conclud-
ing that "effective political control of an agency requires ex ante constraints on the
agency").
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gressional control allows for reliance on expertise and provides cer-
tainty in tax policy, each of which can be beneficial for taxpayers and
the tax system.
A. How Congressional Control Works
1. Congress' Special Institutional Capacity: The Joint Committee
on Taxation
Congressional direction of tax rulemaking, described in the follow-
ing Subsections, is facilitated by the JCT. The JCT is a unique institu-
tion within Congress, designed to bring special expertise, insights, and
consistency to the tax legislative process.76 The JCT is bicameral-its
membership includes Senators and Representatives-and its staff of
approximately sixty-five people consists of nonpartisan tax experts,
primarily lawyers and economists with expertise in specific areas of
tax legislation.77 The JCT staff plays a central role in the tax legisla-
tive process. It provides technical assistance to Congress in devising
tax policy proposals, using its understanding of substantive tax issues
and analysis to help members of Congress be well-informed about the
meaning and potential effects of these proposals. This expert input
76 See George K. Yin, Codification of the Tax Law and the Emergence of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, 71 Tax L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018), manuscript at 5 fn.18, (Univ.
of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2017-39,
2017) (quoting an article written shortly after the JCT completed its first codification of the
Code, which described the significant benefits of the JCT "giv[ing] Congress experienced
and technical help in the preparation of tax bills," quoting Roy G. Blakely & Gladys C.
Blakey, Founders and Builders of the Income Tax, 18 Taxes 271, 274 (1940)), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3008878. In some ways the JCT is similar to the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Offices of Legislative Counsel, see notes
108-112 [x] and accompanying text, although neither is as consistently involved as the JCT
staff is throughout the legislative process. The JCT "is closely involved with every aspect
of the tax legislative process, including... development and analysis of legislative propos-
als . . . [p]reparing official revenue estimates of all tax legislation considered by Con-
gress... [and] [d]rafting legislative histories for tax-related bills." Overview, Joint Comm.
on Tax'n, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2017) [hereinaf-
ter About JCT]. See IRC §§ 8021-8023 (providing the JCT with authority to hold hearings,
issue subpoenas, take testimony under oath, and charging the JCT with investigating the
"operation and effects" of tax laws, and the administration of those laws).
77 John M. Samuels, The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation-From the Outside
Looking In 5-7 (2016), http://uschs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/USCHS-History-Role-
Joint-Committee-Taxation-Samuels.pdf; How the Joint Committee Fulfills Its Statutory
Mandate, Joint Comm. on Tax'n, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/mandate.html (last visited
Aug. 23, 2017). The policy staff is organized into subject-matter teams (for example, do-
mestic business taxation). See Samuels, supra, at 8-9; About JCT, note 76. The member-
ship consists of five members of the House Ways and Means Committee (three from the
majority, two from the minority), and five members of the Senate Finance Committee
(again, three from the majority, two from the minority). Samuels, supra, at 4.
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assists Congress in making precise delegations and limiting Treasury's
policymaking discretion.
78
The JCT staff helps Congress to direct regulatory tax policy by in-
tervening at several important junctures in the legislative process.
First, the JCT is often involved in devising tax legislation, with Con-
gress members' personal staffs and legislative committee staff en-
couraged to consult with the JCT staff as tax legislation is initially
conceived.79 For example, it is common for committee or personal
staff to approach the JCT staff with a policy goal, and seek counsel on
how best to accomplish that goal.80 The JCT staff may provide vari-
ous options, and describe the advantages and disadvantages of differ-
ent approaches.81 This assistance is not limited to the JCT
membership, nor to members of the tax legislating committees. Any
member of Congress can make use of the JCT's services, which means
that tax legislation can be subject to expert quality control at the earli-
est stages, even if it is initiated by members of Congress who do not sit
on the Ways and Means or Finance committees.82 As a proposal is
shaped, the JCT remains engaged, providing assistance with drafting
tax legislation by working closely with the staff of the Offices of Legis-
lative Counsel (there are separate offices for the House and Senate).
83
As a result, the statutory language is informed by JCT experts, and
therefore the drafting process can address details that may be beyond
78 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 Duke
L.J. 1231, 1280-83 (2009) (emphasizing the value of JCT explanations of proposed tax legis-
lation for members of Congress); Joint Committee Role in the Tax Legislative Process,
Joint Comm. on Tax'n, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/role-of-jct.html (last visited Aug. 23,
2017).
79 Samuels, note 77, at 6.
80 Id. at 13.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 16. It is the policy of both the JCT and the CBO that cost-estimating and
revenue-estimating services are available for any measure drafted by any member of Con-
gress, but in practice it may be difficult for junior members and for members who are not
on relevant legislating committees to gain access to these services. Anecdotally, the re-
source constraints (and thus the availability of the services to less influential members of
Congress) are greater at the CBO than at the JCT.
83 See Daniel M. Berman & Victoria J. Haneman, Making Tax Law 118 (2014). Histori-
cally, drafting sessions started with the JCT staff "explaining to the lawyer from the Office
of Legislative Counsel what the purpose of the legislation is, how it was developed, and
what the legislation is meant to achieve. They will then discuss the way in which this is best
structured into legislative language." Id. The JCT's involvement contributes to the quality
of tax legislation as well, providing "important continuity in the legislative process" that
helps it to proceed more "smoothly and efficiently" than the process for other types of
legislation, which often involves multiple drafters operating in isolation and fumbled hand-
offs between houses of Congress and between different committees and staffs. Samuels,
note 77, at 7-8.
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the capacity of congressional staff in other contexts.84 This expert in-
volvement at the outset of the legislative process allows for early con-
sideration of the minutiae of proposed legislation, which can
contribute to producing detailed delegations of regulatory authority.
The second way that the JCT helps Congress to control tax
rulemaking is by providing Congress with revenue estimates for tax
legislation.85 When the JCT staff prepares a revenue estimate, it gen-
erally also prepares a written summary of the proposed measure.86
Revenue estimates have become especially important over the last
two decades because of the particular procedural rules attached to
them,87 including budget reconciliation rules and Pay-as-You-Go
(PAYGO) rules, which require that tax cuts and increases in
mandatory spending be revenue neutral (for example, a spending in-
crease must be offset by a tax increase, or a tax cut accompanied by a
spending cut).88 JCT revenue estimates are required for any tax pro-
posal that is considered on the floor of either house of Congress (just
as the CBO is required to provide cost estimates for nontax legisla-
tion).89 As a result, even when legislation is proposed by leadership
84 In contrast, typical (nontax) legislation generally is shaped exclusively by a legislator's
personal staff or by political staff on a legislating committee. See generally Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside-An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 725
(2014) (describing the relevant influences on the drafting process that are outside the
Court's interpretive rules). Although political staff often work with legislative counsel and
CBO staff, the political staffers often lack the experience and subject-matter expertise of
the JCT staff. See Samuels, note 77, at 5-6 (noting that bipartisan staff is unique for con-
gressional committees). The legislating committees in each house have professional staff
that are associated with either the majority or minority party (and change in size and com-
position each Congress when power shifts), and thus do not serve as a repository for insti-
tutional knowledge in the same manner that the JCT does.
85 See Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process 92 (9th ed.
2014). A revenue estimate is the "score" of a tax proposal, that is, the projected revenue to
be collected as compared to an estimate of future revenue collections if existing policy
remains unchanged. See id. at 72.
86 Samuels, note 77, at 16-17; JCT Legislative Process, note 78; see notes 92-96 and
accompanying text.
87 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in
the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 525-26 (1998). Importantly, revenue
estimates can be kept confidential if the requesting member of Congress so desires, and
often are kept confidential. This facilitates JCT involvement in the formulation of reve-
nue-raising policy because members of Congress and their staffs know that they can test
ideas and check the revenue effects of alternative proposals without any publicity, but it
makes the JCT's early involvement opaque. See Berman & Haneman, note 83, at 120 (also
noting that these revenue requests are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act).
88 See id. at 507-14 (describing the 1990 version of PAYGO); David Kamin, Risky Re-
turns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 Ind. LJ. 723, 726 n.13 (2013)
(describing the current PAYGO rules and related annual caps on discretionary spending).
89 See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 as amended, 2
U.S.C. § 602(g) (requiring the CBO to estimate the costs of federal mandates in certain
circumstances), § 653 (directing the CBO to prepare cost estimates for all bills of a public
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unilaterally (and even when this occurs on an extremely expedited ba-
sis), the JCT is usually consulted in the policy formulation and draft-
ing process, and provides a revenue estimate.
90 The JCT also
prepares basic distributional analysis of tax provisions, which allows
Congress to anticipate the effects of tax legislation on different groups
of taxpayers.91
There are two recent prominent examples of legislation that were
devised by congressional eadership under extreme time constraints,
for which the JCT staff nonetheless prepared revenue estimates and
explanations of the provisions that were used by Congress prior to
enactment: (1) the Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes (PATH)
Act of 2015,92 which extended various temporary tax provisions, and
(2) the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012, 93 which is the
so-called "fiscal cliff" legislation that made permanent some of the
Bush-era tax cuts and permanently indexed the Alternative Minimum
Tax. The PATH Act was accompanied by revenue estimates and ex-
tensive legislative history prepared by the JCT, detailing each provi-
sion of the law.94 The ATRA was accompanied by revenue estimates,
but no JCT or committee reports providing technical explanations of
character reported out of almost any Committee of Congress) (2012); Samuels, note 77, at
16. The JCT has a devoted staff of approximately twenty economists who focus on revenue
estimates. Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 115th Cong., www.jct.gov/about-US/current-
staff.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2017). The Byrd Rule in the Senate and the PAYGO rules
further increase the importance of revenue and cost estimates in the legislative process.
See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative
Processes, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 863 (2002) (describing a prior incarnation of the PAYGO rules).
A new version of PAYGO was enacted in 2010. See Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8.
90 When proposed legislation is enacted in a particularly hurried manner, Congress may
act with less input from the JCT than is provided under the idealized tax legislative
process.
91 The JCT prepares distributional analysis that accounts for taxes paid. This analysis
does not include analysis of the distributional effects of the corporate income tax, estate
tax, or gift tax. Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 109th Cong., JCX-1-05, Overview of Reve-
nue Estimating Procedures and Methodologies Used by the Staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation 22-29 (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.jct.gov/x-1-05.pdf.
92 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242
(2015).
93 Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013).
94 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 114th Cong., JCX-144-15, Technical Explanation
of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015, House Amendment #2 to the
Senate Amendment to H.R.2029 (Comm. Print 2015), https://www.jct.gov/publica-
tioins.html?func=startown&is=4861 [hereinafter PATH Act Explanation]; Staff of Joint
Comm. on Tax'n, 113th Cong., JCX-143-15, Estimated Budget Effects of Division Q of
Amendment #2 to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 2029 (Rules committee print 114-40),
"protecting Americans From Tax Hikes Act of 2015" (2015), https://www.jct.gov/publica-
tions.html?func=tartdown&id-4 860.
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the provisions.95 However, the JCT did prepare explanations for
some of the provisions in ATRA when those provisions were consid-
ered by the legislating committees as parts of earlier legislative pro-
posals, and it is possible to trace the legislative language back to those
explanations.96 That is, the JCT had previously been involved in the
formulation of the some of the provisions that were added to ATRA.
The third way that the JCT helps Congress to control tax rulemak-
ing is in the various ways that JCT staff are involved in consideration
and negotiation of tax legislation by the House Committee on Ways
and Means and the Senate Finance Committee. JCT staff participates
in meetings and hearings, markups,97 and conference committee nego-
tiations.98 When one of the legislating committees is preparing for a
markup, the JCT staff usually produces explanations of the provisions
in the initial legislative proposal to be considered by the committee.99
Often these "conceptual" summary explanations are prepared in con-
junction with drafting statutory language and producing revenue esti-
mates.100 The committees generally base their markup on these
95 See Cong. Budget Office, Detail on Estimated Budgetary Effects of Title VI (Medi-
care and Other Health Extensions) of H.R. 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012,
as passed by the Senate on Jan. 1, 2013 (Jan. 9, 2013), www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/ll2th-
congress-2011-2012/costestimate/senatehr8.titlevioo.pdf.
96 E.g., Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 112th Cong., JCX-69-12, Description of the
Chairman's Modification to the Proposals of the "Family Business Tax Cut Certainty Act
of 2012" (Aug.2, 2012), www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id4481 (describ-
ing a special basis recovery provision for "motorsports entertainment complexes," a provi-
sion that was incorporated in the ATRA).
97 The markup is the process through which committee members amend and agree upon
the content of a bill to be approved by the committee. See Oleszek, note 85, at 131. In an
idealized legislative process, a tax bill is introduced in the House, and then referred to the
Ways and Means Committee, which holds a hearing on the bill, calling in experts to testify
about various aspects of the proposal. Next the committee members devise amendments
to the proposed bill. The markup can take different forms, but it might be carried out as a
meeting among the committee members whereby the members discuss each proposed
amendment and vote on them, one by one. Once all amendments have been considered,
the committee can vote to report the bill out of committee, so that it can be considered by
the full House. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch:
Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform 121-26 (1988) (describing
colorfully a Ways and Means markup of what would become the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
98 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 78. A conference committee is an "ad hoc joint commit-
tee" with membership from both the House and the Senate, convened to resolve differ-
ences between competing versions of legislation passed by each house. Oleszek, note 85,
at 332. The conference committee negotiates final legislation that is then sent to each
house for approval, and can be signed into law by the President. Id. Conference commit-
tee reports are prepared by some combination of JCT staff and legislating committee staff
working at the direction of conference committee members, and are (generally) provided
to the members of each house before the final vote.
99 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 78.
100 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the In-
side-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I,
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 968 (2013) (describing "conceptual" explanations as the basis for
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descriptions along with "one-pagers," prepared by the JCT staff
describing proposed amendments to be considered during the
markup.10' The committees use these materials to debate and adopt
committee drafts rather than reviewing actual statutory language.
102
These materials are also relied upon when a bill reaches a conference
committee, as well as with bills that are brought straight to the
floor.'
0 3
The JCT's expertise allows for Congress consistently to legislate at a
level of detail uncommon to other areas of statutory law, accomplish-
ing a sort of preemptive gap-filling. That is, rather than leaving gaps
for Treasury to fill-in via regulation, Congress addresses many details
itself and articulates directives to Treasury in the form of detailed
statements and precise legislative history.10 4 At each juncture as tax
policy is formulated and enacted, the JCT helps members of Congress
and their staffs continue to enhance the precision and detail of tax
delegations in this manner. By bringing technical expertise to this
policymaking and drafting process-helping develop initial concepts,
formulating statutory language, providing technical expertise during
committee work, and preparing explanations and revenue estimates-
the JCT staff helps Congress and members' personal staffs work
through the details of delegations to Treasury. This contributes to
members of Congress developing a more precise conception, prior to
enactment, of what Treasury should do to carry out a delegation of tax
authority.
Further, the JCT's explanations, prepared at various points
throughout the legislative process, are the basis for the compilations
of highly detailed legislative history that are circulated to members of
Congress prior to final enactment of tax legislation.10 5 The close con-
action undertaken by the Senate Finance Committee, as well as the House Budget Com-
mittee); Michael Livingston, Congress, The Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and
the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 819, 833-35 (1991) (describing the Sen-
ate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee as relying on "conceptual"
descriptions of legislation prepared by the JCT staff); Bradford L. Ferguson, Frederic W.
Hickman & Donald C. Lubick, Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative His-
tory in Light of the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 Taxes 804, 809-10 (1989)
(describing how the "committees make their mark-up decisions on the basis of general
concepts and descriptions").
101 Berman & Haneman, note 83, at 118.
102 See note 100.
103 Sometimes, as with the PATH Act, described in note 94, the JCT issues explanations
of provisions of legislation that are not reported out of a legislating committee or are not
the product of a conference committee. See, e.g., Joint Comm. on Tax'n, PATH Act Expla-
nation, note 94.
104 Gap-filling refers to congressional delegations to elaborate and fill in details of a
statute. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 58 (2011);
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2003).
105 See, e.g., Joint Comm. on Tax'n, PATH ACT Explanation, note 94.
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nection between the development of this legislative history and the
legislative process and revenue estimates that shape particular tax
provisions, along with Congress' reliance on conceptual summaries to
shape and enact tax legislation, makes this legislative history particu-
larly insightful as to how tax provisions are expected to be construed
and the particular content of anticipated regulations contemporane-
ous with the enactment of the legislative provisions.106
For example, the Conference Report to the Tax Reform Act of 1986
is rife with statements like, "the conferees expect that the Treasury
Department will promulgate regulations regarding ... ." and "[u]nder
grants of regulatory authority in the conference agreement, the con-
ferees expect the Treasury Department to publish regulations disre-
garding .... ",107 That is, rather than leaving open issues to be hashed
out solely by Treasury personnel, Congress is able to direct what Trea-
sury should do on particular issues, and members of Congress can
benefit from this understanding prior to voting on final legislation.
The role of the JCT is in some ways similar to the roles played in
nontax legislation by the CBO and the Offices of Legislative Counsel.
The CBO is a nonpartisan office of Congress that provides analysis on
the budget effects of proposed legislation, as well as other budgetary
analysis, to both houses of Congress.0  The CBO's primary involve-
ment in the legislative process is through cost estimates for proposed
legislation.10 9 The CBO relies on JCT analysis for revenue estimates
of tax legislation, so in some respects the CBO staff and JCT staff
jointly produce work product for Congress. CBO cost estimates have
been recognized as critically important to the legislative process, and
legislation is sometimes crafted around the CBO's cost estimates, in
consultation with CBO staff.11 0 But the CBO does not help devise
and shape legislation in the same manner that the JCT does, nor does
106 Cf. Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 26 (2014) (describing tax committee re-
ports as "essential guidance" to Treasury). Legislative history is recognized by judges,
scholars, and policymakers as a key-if at times controversial-way for Congress to influ-
ence administrative decisionmaking. See Bressman & Gluck, note 84; Katzmann, supra, at
11-22. But see, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev.
419 (2005) (arguing that Congress cannot have a cohesive intent, and that as such the only
product of the legislative process that courts should rely on in construing a statute is the
"public meaning" of the statutory language).
107 H.R. Rep. No. 99-841, pt. 2, at 11-173 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
108 See Cong. Budget Office, An Introduction to the Congressional Budget Office (July
2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/efaultlfile/cbofiles/attachment/2016-IntroToCBO.pdf.
109 Id.
110 See Bressman & Gluck, note 84, at 764 (describing congressional staff reports that
statutory language is crafted to achieve specific cost estimates, often requiring tweaking
and repeated back and forth with the CBO staff focused on fitting within particular budget
constraints); Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of For-
malism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They Are
Already Trying To Do, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 177, 182 (2017).
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the CBO prepare explanations of statutory provisions in the way that
the JCT does.111 The Offices of Legislative Counsel also perform a
role that is in some ways similar to the JCT. These offices consist of
nonpartisan staff that assist member staff and committee staff with
drafting statutory language. These staff primarily serve a technical
role in crafting the actual legislative language, and their expertise
comes to bear on virtually all legislation.112 The task of drafting tax
legislation and analyzing proposed tax legislation directly inspired the
creation of the Offices of Legislative Counsel, and the JCT was a pre-
cursor to the CBO as well.113 Today, those offices in some ways repli-
cate the functions of the JCT, but the JCT also augments the capacity
of the CBO and Offices of Legislative Counsel, and is more compre-
hensively involved in the legislative process for tax legislation than
CBO or the Offices of Legislative Counsel are for nontax legislation.
2. Constrained Statutory Delegations to Treasury
Facilitated by the JCT, which focuses on details of tax legislation
throughout the legislative process, congressional delegations of tax
rulemaking authority very often leave little policymaking discretion as
compared to the sorts of broad delegations that are prevalent in the
modern administrative state. Whereas the paradigmatic "meaningless
standard" gives agency personnel plenary policymaking discretion,
14
Mu For example, unlike the JCT, the CBO does not draft statutory language and is not
directly involved in drafting sessions with the Offices of Legislative Counsel, does not does
not participate in committee markups, and does not meet with constituents concerning
legislation on behalf of members of Congress. Compare Cong. Budget Office, note 108
(describing the CBO's role as limited to scoring legislation and providing reports commis-
sioned by Congress), with Joint Comm. on Tax'n, About Us: Joint Committee Role in the
Tax Legislative Process, https://www.jct.gov/about-us/role-of-jct. h ml (describing the JCT's
role as including helping with developing, analyzing, drafting, and preparing descriptions of
bills). The CBO sometimes provides comments on proposed legislation, indicating what
elements of the legislation are affecting cost estimates, whereas the JCT is a direct partici-
pant in drafting and markup sessions. Id.; see Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell &
Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789,
1825 (2015).
112 Within the Offices of Legislative Counsel tax drafting is recognized as an advanced
specialty and is reserved as a promotion for experienced drafters. Cf. Samuels, note 77, at
12-14.
113 The Offices of Legislative Counsel initially came to exist to assist with tax legislation
after the House Ways and Means Committee sought outside assistance drafting early in-
come tax bills, and the offices were formalized under the Revenue Act of 1918. Revenue
Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057; see Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory
Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 807, 820
(2015). The CBO was created as part of the overhaul of the congressional budget process
in 1974, decades after the JCT was put in place. See Cong. Budget Office, History, https://
www.cbo.gov/about/history (last visited Oct. 5, 2017).
114 See notes 63-65.
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delegations in the tax context are often characterized by specific direc-
tives embedded in comprehensive statutory schemes that leave few
discretionary policy choices for Treasury regulation writers.
115
The phenomenon of limited delegations in tax legislation was iden-
tified in work by David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran. They created
a metric to measure the breadth of executive branch discretion, and
using several different data sets they determined that tax laws confer
among the least discretion to the executive branch, that is, tax laws
involve the most constrained delegations.1 6 One data set included
legislative enactments from 1947 to 1986, which were divided into
forty-three issue categories.117 Tax legislation delegated the third low-
est level of discretion (that is, Congress gave the Executive Branch
greater discretion in forty other issue areas).118 A second data set
covered laws enacted from 1946 to 1995, categorized by the committee
that was assigned the legislation in the House.119 This data showed
that legislation from the Ways and Means Committee, the committee
responsible for tax legislation (among many other areas), conferred
the fourth lowest level of discretion among nineteen committee cate-
gories.20 Additionally, an analysis of particular pieces of legislation
found that several tax bills were among the legislation with the lowest
level of discretion, including the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which had
the lowest overall discretion.121 A third data set of legislation enacted
from 1789 through 1988 showed that legislation involving "tax rates"
had the lowest discretion among fifty-four issue categories.22 In sum,
115 See Pierce, note 24, § 2.6, at 100 ("[m]eaningful substantive standards reflect policy
decisions that Congress makes and imposes on an agency").
116 David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers 196-206 (1999). The au-
thors constructed a "discretion index" that calculated overall discretion based on the ex-
tent to which statutes delegated authority to the executive branch, and the extent to which
that authority was constrained. Id. at 86-120. The extent of delegation is measured
through a combination of a quantified measure of delegations (for example, provisions that
authorize "discretionary rulemaking authority," allow the agency to "modify or change
decision-making criteria," allow an agency to allocate money or benefits with the amounts
or recipients at the discretion of the agency, or allow for the agency to provide for waivers
or exemptions from generally applicable rules), along with a quantified measure of con-
straints on delegations (for example, time limits, requirements for legislative action, re-
quirements for public hearings or particular procedures, or consultation or reporting
requirements).
117 Id. at 198.
118 Id. at 199 tbl.8.1 (summarizing data showing that only Congress' copyright and social
security laws granted less discretion than tax laws).
119 Id. at 200-01.
120 Id. at 205 fig.8.2.
121 Id. at 96 tbl.5.3 (also noting the legislation with the highest levels of discretion, which
included several pieces of environmental and public health legislation).
122 Id. at 200, 202 tbl.8.2. This is the only data set that focused particularly on "tax
rates." The term is not further elaborated, but it is possible that the legislation included is
limited to revenue-raising legislation that includes tax rate changes, which would make this
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Congress often maintains control of the details of tax delegations
rather than cede policymaking discretion to Treasury, and does so to a
greater extent with tax authority than with other types of legislation.
This is not to say that highly constrained delegations are unique to tax,
but such delegations seem to be more prevalent in tax than in other
areas of law.'2
3
There are many examples of highly detailed tax statute provisions
that require or have resulted in regulations, but leave very little dis-
cretion to Treasury. To take one, in 1986 Congress amended § 382 to
limit the use of net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards by a corpora-
tion that changes ownership.124 NOLs are valuable to profitable com-
panies because they can be used to offset taxable income, thus
reducing income tax liability. In the early 1980's, corporate transac-
tions were sometimes driven by profitable corporations' desire to ac-
quire corporations with unused NOLs. Congress decided to limit the
value of NOLs to new owners to discourage tax-driven transactions.
The statute Congress enacted, § 382, is very precise. It provides that
use of NOLs will be limited when there is an "ownership change.'125
The term "ownership change" is defined in another subsection to in-
clude any "owner shift involving a 5-percent shareholder or any equity
structure shift," if either such shift results in an increase by fifty per-
centage points or more in the percentage of stock owned by 5 % share-
holders during the "testing period.' 26 The terms "owner shift" and
"equity structure shift" are each defined in detail,1 27 as is the term
"testing period. 12 8 Many other particulars are specified as well-the
statute runs approximately sixteen pages in a bound copy of the
Code.129 Because Congress created a comprehensive scheme in the
statute, providing many details about how the scheme should function,
the regulations issued under § 382 are focused on implementing the
very specific policy set by Congress.1 30
Not all delegations of tax rulemaking authority are as constrained
as § 382. But, even when Congress makes broad delegations, its tax-
data not particularly illuminating (in that Congress has not ceded rate setting authority to
Treasury, even as it has granted discretion in other respects).
123 See Subsection III.A.1 (discussing Congress' institutional capacity, unique to tax,
that facilitates this).
124 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 621, 100 Stat. 2085, 2254.
125 IRC § 382(a), (d).
126 IRC § 382(g)(1).
127 IRC § 382(g)(1), (2), (3).
128 IRC § 382(i).
129 CCH, Internal Revenue Code: Income Taxes §§ 1-860G 1430-46 (2017).
130 See notes 144-46 (describing regulations proposed under § 382, including regulations
proposed in 2015, summarized in Appendix II, and describing how Congress provided ex-
plicit directions in the legislative history that accompanied § 382 as to what the regulations
should include).
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ing authority is limited in comparison to other congressional powers.
The Supreme Court recently described Congress' taxing power as
highly proscribed in comparison to the Commerce Clause power
under which Congress acts in other regulatory pursuits. On the one
hand, once the Court "recognize[s] that Congress may regulate a par-
ticular decision under the Commerce Clause, the Federal Government
can bring its full weight to bear.1 31 In contrast, however, "Congress's
authority under the taxing power is limited to requiring an individual
to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no more.
132
There are, of course, some prominent counterexamples to the
highly constrained delegations of tax authority, which show Treasury
and the IRS acting with significant discretion in determining how to
require taxpayers to determine tax liability. Section 7805(a) provides
general authority for Treasury to issue regulations elaborating on any
provision of the Code. It empowers Treasury to issue "all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement of" the Code.1 33 On first
blush, this appears to be a very broad and standardless grant by Con-
gress of rulemaking authority to Treasury. Additionally, there are
several tax provisions134 that consist of broad delegations that are sim-
ilar to § 482, which provides Treasury with authority to combat some
abusive tax practices between related entities.1 35 Scholars and courts
have often referred to § 482 as among the broadest delegations of au-
thority in the Code.1 36 These statutes make clear that Congress does
not control all tax rulemaking. Sometimes Congress enacts broad tax
131 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 573 (2012). In theory, any regu-
latory mandate could be carried out as a tax-a 100% tax, for example, is extremely coer-
cive-but the Supreme Court has held that this sort of penalty would not pass muster
under Congress' taxing power. See id. at 565-66 (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922)).
132 Id. at 574; see also Mariano-Florentino Cudllar, Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regula-
tory Bargains in Public Health Law, in Preventing Regulatory Capture 326, 360 (Daniel
Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) (identifying that the IRS "wield[s] limited author-
ity" in comparison to the Food and Drug Administration).
133 IRC § 7805(a). Prior to Mayo, there was a widely held view in the tax community
that regulations issued under § 7805(a) were "interpretative" rules that did not carry the
force of law and need not be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking. See Mitchell
Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R's Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and
Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, Tax Mag., Aug. 2009, at 21, 22.
Mayo dispensed with this distinction; whether Treasury issues a regulation under specific
authority or under the general § 7805(a) authority has no bearing on how that regulation
should be treated for judicial review. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United
States, 562 U.S. 44, 57-58 (2011).
134 E.g. §§ 1502, 367(b)(1)
135 See note 43. Regulations issued under § 482 rely on the authority provided under
§ 7805(a); § 482 does not include a specific grant of authority to promulgate regulations.
136 See, e.g., Hines & Logue, note 69, at 251 (referring to § 482 and § 1502, the latter of
which is a similar provision applying to corporations filing consolidated returns, as "unusu-
ally broad tax delegation[s]").
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statutes that do not limit Treasury's discretion, or do not limit Trea-
sury's discretion as to all future circumstances in which Treasury might
exercise delegated power.
137
But even when Treasury uses its general authority to issue regula-
tions for the broadest provisions of the Code, Treasury's discretion
may be constrained relative to the discretion Congress typically has
granted in other areas of law. First, even authority granted in § 482 is
still a far cry from an environmental or public health delegation that
empowers an agency to use its "judgment" or to act "reasonably.'1 38
A tax corollary to the sort of "empty standard" that is commonplace
in other contexts might call for Treasury to collect "reasonably ade-
quate revenue to fund government operations," or something equally
vague,13 9 but Congress has not adopted this approach in its delega-
tions of tax authority.140 Second, as discussed in the next Subsection,
Treasury's discretion under the Code is constrained and controlled by
Congress through another mechanism: explicit legislative history that
accompanied amendments to the Code.
141
3. Explicit Legislative History Produced by the JCT
Tax legislative history, produced with the aid of the JCT staff, fre-
quently provides explicit directions as to how Treasury should exercise
its authority to issue tax regulations, which limits its policymaking dis-
cretion.1 42 This explicit tax legislative history can take various forms.
Legislative history can be so precise and explicit hat it becomes, ver-
batim, the text of a tax regulation proposed by Treasury. For instance,
Congress essentially wrote the regulations under § 382, described
above,'43 through the legislative history that accompanied this provi-
sion. The legislative history includes some twenty-five specific exam-
ples detailing how the statutory language should apply in specific
circumstances, and these examples (and the much of the same lan-
guage from the legislative history) were adopted in Treasury's regula-
137 See Part V, discussing implications of congressional control of tax rulemaking, and
also considering statutes and regulations that do not result from the workings of congres-
sional control.
138 These are examples of the sort of "empty standards" that Richard Pierce reports
have proliferated in nontax contexts. See Pierce, note 24, § 2.6, at 100-02; notes 63-65 and
accompanying text.
139 Cf. Hines & Logue, note 69, at 237, 272 (proposing that Congress make broad dele-
gations of taxing authority to Treasury).
140 Id. at 273.
141 See notes 148-52 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history of § 482
that governed the regulation at issue in Altera).
142 See Katzmann, note 106, at 26.
143 See notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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tions.144 These examples limit Treasury's discretion to interpret § 382
in any ways that are contrary to the examples.
Alternatively, legislative history can explain congressional intent as
to how a statute should be interpreted so as to limit Treasury's range
of options in drafting a tax regulation. For example, a separate provi-
sion of § 382 (distinct from the provisions described above) requires
reference to an interest rate to calculate the amount of the loss limita-
tion; the legislative history explained the purpose of the rate and what
the value of the rate should be in relation to market rates.145 This
directive required Treasury to develop an actual method for calculat-
ing the rate on an ongoing basis, but Treasury had very little discretion
because Congress was clear as to what Treasury should accomplish via
regulation.
146
Further, legislative history can expressly incorporate (or overrule)
statutory interpretations made by courts or by Treasury. For example,
when Congress enacted § 707(a), which provides rules for transactions
between a partnership and a partner in that partnership who is acting
in a nonpartner capacity (for example, a partner acting as an em-
ployee and receiving payment for services), the legislative history ex-
144 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-841, pt. 2, at 170-96 (1986) (Conf. Rep.); see, e.g., Reg. § 1.382-
2T(e)(1)(iii)(Ex. 2) (tracking H.R. 99-841, at 175 example 3); Reg. § 1.382-2T(j)(1)(vi)(Ex.
2) (tracking H.R. 99-841, at 181 example 17); text accompanying notes 125-130 (describing
§ 382).
145 Section 382 limits the annual use of NOLs by the new owners to the value of the loss
corporation multiplied by the "long-term tax-exempt rate." IRC § 382(b), (f). The long-
term tax-exempt rate is defined later in the statute as the "Federal long-term rate," which
is defined in § 1274(d) as the average rate of long-term Treasury notes, which then must be
"adjusted for differences between rates on long-term taxable and tax-exempt obligations."
IRC § 382(f). The legislative history that accompanied § 382(f) prescribes that the long-
term tax-exempt rate should be lower than the federal long-term rate, and explains that
otherwise the NOL could be worth more in the hands of an acquirer than in the hands of a
loss corporation, which could sell its assets, invest in long-term Treasury notes, and use
income from the Treasury notes to absorb the NOL. H.R. Rep. No. 99-841, note 144, at
188. This legislative history further specifies that the long-term tax-exempt rate should fall
between the long-term federal rate and that rate multiplied by one minus the corporate tax
rate, but the legislative history does not prescribe the exact method Treasury should use to
achieve this result. Id.
146 In 1986, Treasury adopted a method for calculating this rate that consisted of multi-
plying the long-term federal rate by a fraction that consisted of the rate for "the highest-
grade tax-exempt obligations available" over the "composite yield of U.S. Treasury obliga-
tions with maturities similar to those of the tax exempt obligations." Prop. Reg. §§ 1.382-
12, 1.1288-1, 80 Fed. Reg. 11,141, 11,142 (Mar. 2, 2015). But from 2008 onward, the yield
on these tax-exempt obligations sometimes has been higher than the yield on U.S. Treasur-
ies, which meant that the long-term tax-exempt rate for § 382 purposes sometimes was
higher than the federal long-term rate, thus defeating Congress' policy objective. Id. Trea-
sury proposed a regulation that provided a new method for calculating the rate, consistent
with congressional policy as provided in the legislative history. Id. at 11,413. The regula-
tion was finalized in 2016. Reg. § 1.382-12.
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plicitly adopted a position previously taken by Treasury in a Revenue
Ruling.
147
Finally, legislative history can address a specific scenario that Con-
gress anticipates will arise, and direct how regulations should address
that scenario. For example, the Altera case concerns how a new provi-
sion of § 482 should apply to "cost-sharing agreements.' 148 The court
focused on a regulation that followed from legislative history that ac-
companied Congress' enactment of the second sentence of § 482,
which applies to "intangible property."'1 49 In making its determination,
the court turned to a detailed legislative history directing how the new
provision, should apply in this circumstance.1 50 Congress specified in
the legislative history that it did not intend to alter the existing prac-
tice of using cost-sharing agreements, which allow related taxpayers to
share proportionally the costs and proceeds of developing intangible
property, so long as the agreements account for "all research and de-
velopment costs."1' 51 Treasury promulgated a regulation that required
cost-sharing agreements to include stock-based compensation for em-
ployees who developed intangible property (among other costs), car-
rying out the mandate from Congress provided in the legislative
history (although this is being disputed in the ongoing litigation).
1 52
Thus, Congress can employ various methods to control tax rulemak-
ing through legislative history. Legislative history allows Congress to
make clear how enacted provisions should be construed for purposes
of tax regulations, and limits Treasury's discretion; when Treasury's
tax regulations conform to that construction, the resultant rules can be
traced directly back to Congress.
147 S. Comm. on Fin., 98th Cong., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Explanation of Provi-
sions Approved by the Committee on March 21, 1984, vol. I, at 230 (Comm. Print. 1984);
see also Prop. Reg. § 1.707-1, -9, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,652, 43,652-53 (July 23, 2015) (summariz-
ing Rev. Rul. 81-300 and Rev. Rul. 81-301 and Congress' adoption thereof). Interestingly,
the proposed regulation directs that prior to the rule being finalized, the statute will be
applied "on the basis of the statute and the guidance provided regarding that provision in
the legislative history .... Id. at 43,661 (citing the Senate Report and other legislative
history).
148 Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 91, 92 (2015), appeal docketed, Nos. 16-
70496, 16-70497 (9th Cir., argued on Oct. 11, 2017); see notes 42-46 (describing the Altera
case).
149 Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(2); IRC § 482; see note 43 (quoting § 482).
150 Altera Corp., 145 T.C. at 96-98 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 423-26 (1985); H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 99-841 (Vol. II), at 11-637 through 11-638 (1986)).
151 H.R. Rep. No. 99-841, note 144, at 638.
152 Reg. § 1.482-7A(d)(2); see notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing the ongo-
ing Altera litigation and Treasury's alleged failure to follow the appropriate rulemaking
process for § 482 of the Code). Brief of 19 Tax Law and Administrative Law Professors,
Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497 (9th Cir.).
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In summary, Congress can control tax rulemaking both through
highly detailed legislation that effectively constrains Treasury's discre-
tion in tax rulemaking, and through explicit legislative history that di-
rects the content of tax regulations. The JCT's expertise provides
powerful institutional support for Congress to be able to dictate pre-
cise tax policy prescriptions to Treasury.
B. The Normative Case for Congressional Control
Political scientists and legal scholars have recognized the potential
for Congress to provide politically accountable supervision of the ad-
ministrative state.153 Some scholars have even advocated for a "con-
gressional control" model of the administrative state.154 And
constitutional law scholars have developed these claims in arguing
that reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine 55 would shift poli-
cymaking-and accountability for policy decisions-back to Con-
gress.156 But these arguments for shifting power to Congress and
153 See, e.g., Stewart, note 1, at 1693-94; Mashaw, note 20, at 9-10; 314 (describing stat-
utes that are detailed and specific as satisfying "electoral democracy"); Bressman & Gluck,
note 84, at 772-73 (surveying congressional staff and identifying legislative history as a tool
used by Congress to influence agency interpretation of statutes); Kagan, note 57, at 2255
("Congress, however, proved over time either unable or unwilling to legislate consistently"
with "detailed and limited grants of authority to administrative bodies."); Edward Rubin,
The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073,
2076 (2005) ("[M]ore detailed and definitive legislation would place agencies under greater
Congressional control and thus detract from the president's ability to guide these agencies
in furtherance of his policy objectives."); Seidenfeld, note 67, at 1515; Mark Seidenfeld,
Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 Admin.
L. Rev. 429, 442-44 (1999). But see Stewart, note 2, at 1695 n.127 (suggesting that tax
legislation may constitute an exception to his general critique of the transmission belt
model); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61 (2006)
(providing a comprehensive overview of ex ante and ex post mechanisms for congressional
control of administration).
154 Beermann, note 153, at 158; see generally Epstein & O'Halloran, note 116, at 232
(arguing that in situations where the political benefits exceed the political costs, Congress
maintains control rather than delegating to agencies, and vice versa); McCubbins et al.,
note 52, at 243-46; McCubbins et al., note 75, at 432-33.
155 The nondelegation doctrine provides that Congress cannot delegate the powers it has
been granted under Article I of the Constitution. Pierce, note 24, § 2.6, at 98-99. But the
Supreme Court has not enforced the nondelegation doctrine in more than eighty years,
despite routine and extensive delegations by Congress of its legislative power. Id. at
104-05 (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); and A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
156 David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the Peo-
ple Through Delegation 17 (1993) (arguing that broad delegation by Congress "severs the
link between the legislator's vote and the law, upon which depend both democratic ac-
countability and the safeguards of liberty provided by Article I"); Peter H. Aranson, Er-
nest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 63-66 (1982) (advocating for tighter application of the nondelegation doctrine to
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away from agencies have gained little traction in the real world be-
cause, in reality, Congress makes broad delegations to agencies, and
courts have proven reluctant to curtail this practice.
157
As the prior Section details, tax legislation, and thus tax rulemak-
ing, proceeds differently-Congress has the capacity to take control,
and does so through the normal course of enacting tax laws. This Sec-
tion argues that congressional control of tax rulemaking is norma-
tively desirable in three respects: It provides political accountability,
it allows for reliance on expertise in tax policymaking, and it provides
certainty for taxpayers. The first two conditions, political accountabil-
ity and reliance on expertise, are hallmarks of existing justifications
for rulemaking procedures and current approaches to judicial review
of agency decision-making. The final condition, certainty, is widely
viewed as important in tax policymaking.
158
1. Political Accountability
When Congress makes policy decisions directly, without delegating
to the executive branch, members of Congress can be held accounta-
ble for those decisions.1 59 Highly detailed statutes establish a link be-
tween citizens and policies-it is clear that Congress is responsible for
a policy that follows from a detailed statute, and citizens can express
their views of Congress members' actions at the ballot box or by peti-
tioning members of Congress directly. Detailed statutes limit the
range of permissible interpretations of the statute, which satisfies the
rule of law elements of political accountability by providing notice (of
what rules apply) and promoting consistency (so that all taxpayers are
reduce the private benefits that Congress can confer via broad delegations, requiring "leg-
islative specificity" so that "opponents of a regulation will know whom to hold responsible
at the polls"). Ronald Krotoszynski argues that the nondelegation doctrine is particularly
relevant and necessary when Congress exercises the power to tax. Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr., Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and
the Ratification Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J. 239, 246 (2005).
157 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000) ("We
might say that the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and
counting).").
158 E.g. David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Code, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860, 861
(1999) ("A common reaction to anti-abuse rules is horror. Anti-abuse rules seem to elimi-
nate certainty and reliability in the tax law.")
159 See, e.g., Stewart, note 4, at 1672 (stating that the doctrine against delegation of
legislative powers to the executive "appears ultimately to be bottomed on contractarian
political theory running back to Hobbes and Locke, under which consent is the only legiti-
mate basis for the exercise of the coercive power of government"); Beermann, note 153, at
77 ("A key formal method Congress employs to control executive discretion is to nip dis-
cretion in the bud by legislating with precision."); Mashaw, note 20, at 314.
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subject to the same rules applied in the same manner).160 Further,
statutory language is a public and transparent way of communicating
these details. Tax statutes can seem complex and inscrutable, but for
tax experts, detailed statutes can make clear exactly what policy Con-
gress is pursuing.161 This constrained sort of delegation matches the
"transmission belt" model of administrative law that described
rulemaking prior to the rise of the modern administrative state.162
Along the same lines, congressional directives via legislative history
contribute to political accountability, linking congressional decision-
making with tax policy as carried out via regulations. Explicit legisla-
tive history in the form of explanations of tax provisions produced by
the JCT prior to enactment promotes transparency-making clear
that Congress has directed tax regulations-and provides notice of
Congress' policy decisions because legislative history is publicly avail-
able. Greater consistency by Treasury and the courts in following con-
gressional directives-when those directives result from JCT analysis
and preemptive gap filling that Congress has relied on in the legisla-
tive process-would strengthen this line of political accountability,
and is further contemplated in Part V.
Political accountability by way of Congress is particularly well
suited to tax policymaking, because equity is a fundamental considera-
tion in tax policymaking. Evaluating and managing equity is not sus-
ceptible to clinical, objective analysis; as Louis Kaplow pointedly
observed, the criterion of equity in tax policy is "guided largely by
intuition.163 If decisionmaking is in the hands of Congress, that intui-
tion becomes "a political decision about whose constituents will pay
how much to the Treasury.1 64 The cynical view of congressional deci-
sionmaking in tax policy matters is that it is driven by, and therefore
serves, powerful special interests.1 65 But the alternative view is that
160 See note 60 and accompanying text (discussing nonarbitrariness and rule of law con-
siderations); Bressman, note 60, at 462-68; Stack, note 60, at 1992-93.
161 See note 59 and accompanying text (discussing transparency); Kagan, note 57, at
2332.
162 Stewart, note 1, at 1676.
163 Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics 38 (2008); cf. Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor
Lowi, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 391, 398 (1987) (stating that "[o]nce some redistributions of in-
come are accepted as legitimate governmental goals, the line-drawing problem becomes
impossible for courts").
164 Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well? Congress
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891, 896 (1987) (reviewing Jeffrey H.
Birnbaum & Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the
Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform (1987)).
165 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1,
64-111 (1990) (describing public choice theory and critiquing it as incomplete); Linda
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Congress can effectively aggregate constituent preferences in a way
that is desirable.
166
Particularly compared to the alternatives, Congress is uniquely well
positioned to adopt tax policies that are fair (recognizing that there
are many competing visions of what constitutes fair tax policy), and to
adjust those policies in a satisfactory way based on pressure from the
electorate.167 The legislative process for tax legislation is designed to
recognize explicitly the trade-offs involved in raising revenue. Reve-
nue estimates and distributional analysis from the JCT are the best
and most transparent information available on the effects of tax policy
decisions.168 This sort of analysis is not currently replicated in the reg-
ulatory process. And the omnibus nature of tax legislation, addressing
many different tax provisions at once, offers advantages for political
accountability as compared to the regulatory process in which distinct
provisions are considered independently. Congress can make trade-
offs between competing taxpayer groups, and can do so on distribu-
tional or fairness grounds (rather than shrouding distributional deci-
sions in technical justifications). The PAYGO rules and budget
reconciliation framework forces these trade-offs into the legislative
process as well.
Further, Congress is designed to be responsive to the electorate-
no other constitutional body is closer to voters-and tax legislation
receives special constitutional treatment attempting to make it re-
sponsive to popular sentiments.169 Fairness is front and center in most
Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 Tax L. Rev. 617, 665 (2016) ("[T]he political process is un-
likely to resolve the problems faced by invisible taxpayers.").
166 See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557, 578 (2003) (describing the poten-
tial for Congress to be responsive to the "popular will"). Sugin does not endorse Congress
as the preferable institution for setting tax policy, but she notes that the millions of "little
people" who are "economically indispensable" as taxpayers generally do not have "en-
forceable rights in the administrative or judicial structure." Sugin, note 165, at 617. Of
course, these people are (or can be) voters.
167 Cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Pro-
cedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 Yale L.J. 1165, 1178 (1993)
("[T]ax committees and agencies with more numerous and diverse constituencies are less
likely to be captured than direct expenditure institutions subject to fewer and more homo-
geneous pressures.").
168 See, e.g., notes 85-91 and accompanying text; Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 108th
Cong., JCX-1-05, Overview of Revenue Estimating Procedures and Methodologies Used
by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 2-8 (2005), http://www.jct.gov/x-1-05.pdf
(providing a summary of the JCT's revenue-estimating responsibilities).
169 The Origination Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, requires that tax legislation be
adopted first by the House of Representatives (rather than the Senate) because the Foun-
ders agreed that revenue raising-legislation is particularly sensitive, and decided that reve-
nue raising must be controlled by the more democratically accountable part of the
legislature. See 1 Annals of Cong. 361 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). It is generally accepted
that today this is a matter of minor inconvenience for House and Senate leadership rather
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tax policy debates and is a perennial issue in elections,170 so there are
good reasons to think that Congress is attentive to fairness in tax pol-
icy. If Congress is known to be responsible for the details of tax policy
as well as the broad overall policies, that is, if congressional control as
described in this Article is accepted by courts and commentators, it
would bolster congressional accountability to constituents.
Analysis of tax regulations at the agency level narrows the focus as
compared to congressional consideration: Each proposed regulation
is viewed in isolation and the overall trade-offs may be unclear.171
This silo effect of regulatory policymaking is particularly problematic
given the long-term nature of tax policy decisions. The revenue raised
by each distinct tax regulation can affect how much the government
can spend, and how much it must borrow and tax in the future. There-
fore, each tax provision affects taxpayers and government policy be-
yond the immediate and obvious impact on the taxpayers who are
subject to the proposed regulation.172 In contrast, it makes sense for
Congress to consider details of tax policy with the benefit of revenue
estimates and in the form of omnibus tax legislation that deals with
many different tax provisions all at once.
than a real impediment to tax policymaking occurring in the Senate. Rebecca M. Kysar,
The "Shell Bill" Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91 Wash. U. L. Rev. 659,
659 (2014). Scholarly investigation of tax legislation is grounded in an understanding of
the tax legislative process that does not vary from the legislative process for other types of
legislation. Scholars have, at time explicitly, "assume[d] that tax legislation is not meaning-
fully different from nontax legislation." Michael Doran, Tax Legislation in the Contempo-
rary U.S. Congress, 67 Tax L. Rev. 555, 572 (2014) (describing this assumption by Richard
Doemberg and Fred McChesney, and characterizing it as "sensibl[e]"). But see Susannah
Camic Tahk, Everything Is Tax: Evaluating the Structural Transformation of U.S. Poli-
cymaking, 50 Harv. J. Legis. 67, 82 (2013) ("Congress's procedures and rules treat tax laws
differently than other laws.").
170 See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, House G.O.P. Leader Signals He's Open to Obama
Tax Cut, N.Y. Times (Sept. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/O9/13/us/politics/
13cong.html?mcubz=l (in advance of the 2010 mid-term election); President's Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's
Tax System (2005), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Re-
port-Fix-Tax-System-2005.pdf; Nat'l Comm'n on Fiscal Responsibility & Reform, The Mo-
ment of Truth 6 (2010), momentoftruthproject.org ("The President and the leaders of both
parties in both chambers of Congress asked us to address the nation's fiscal challenges in
this decade and beyond. We have worked to offer an aggressive, fair, balanced and biparti-
san proposal .... ); see Sugin, note 165, at 655-56 (stating that fairness is a common
consideration in public debates about tax policy).
171 One aspect of political accountability for an agency's actions is to "make manifest the
trade-offs generated by its rulemaking." Seidenfeld, note 52, at 149.
172 See notes 205-04 and accompanying text (discussing the challenge of representing
the interests of future taxpayers in the notice-and-comment process).
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2. Reliance on Expertise
Another common justification for congressional delegations to
agencies is that agencies have a "comparative advantage" over Con-
gress "in terms of expertise.' 173 This reliance on agency expertise is
also used to justify judicial deference to agencies under Chevron.
174
But the JCT gives Congress unusual technical expertise that it can
apply to tax legislation. As detailed in the previous Section, the JCT
helps Congress formulate policy at the earliest planning stages, helps
draft statutory language, provides technical expertise during commit-
tee work, prepares explanations, and generates revenue estimates and
distributional tables.175 In the assessment of two former Treasury offi-
cials, "[t]he Joint Committee staff has maintained over the years a
level of institutionalized expertise that, though analogous to the Trea-
sury within the executive branch, is quite unusual within Congress.
'"176
Thus the typical policymaking tension-between congressional deci-
sionmaking that lacks expertise, and agency decisionmaking that ben-
efits from expertise but requires political accountability from some
other source-is moderated by Congress' unusual tax expertise
housed in the JCT.
Further, this expertise consistently comes to bear on tax policymak-
ing in Congress, because the details of tax legislation are so important
for revenue estimates, and revenue estimates are an inextricable fea-
ture of the tax legislative process. Broad delegations make revenue
estimates difficult, but detailed directives to agencies that leave little
question about what policy Treasury and the IRS will implement are
much more conducive to revenue estimates. As the JCT works with
legislators and their staffs to produce tax legislation, they fill in gaps
that might-absent congressional capacity to perform the work, and
absent the necessity for purposes of estimating revenue-be left to
agency personnel in another context.
3. Taxpayer Certainty
Congressional control promotes certainty in tax policy, particularly
as compared to models of administration where political accountabil-
ity flows from other sources. Certainty for taxpayers is an important
173 Hines & Logue, note 69, at 261.
174 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (ex-
plaining that congressional delegations may be motivated by the understanding "that those
with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would
be in a better position to do so").
175 See Subsection III.A.1.
176 George P. Schultz & Kenneth W. Dam, Economic Policy Beyond the Headlines 63
(1977).
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feature of federal tax law because administering the tax system relies
on self-assessment by taxpayers. The rules, thus, anticipate taxpayers
arranging their affairs to comply with the laws. Certainty in tax ad-
ministration encapsulates both (1) clarity as to the meaning of tax
laws, and (2) consistency as to how those laws are applied over time.
Highly detailed statutes and explicit legislative history contribute to
clarity because as soon as a bill is enacted, taxpayers and tax practi-
tioners can have a clear view of the meaning and planned application
of specific provisions. Often the legislative history accompanying tax
legislation provides the most easily understood explanation of the in-
tended meaning of a statutory provision.177
Further, these statutes and legislative history contribute to consis-
tency over time because they are immutable post-enactment; they
each contribute to a fundamental stability in the tax system. In con-
trast, if the tax system were characterized by broad delegations that
could be recast as political winds shifted, tax administration might
take on a much different character and certainty would be under-
mined.178 Consistency has potential downsides as well, though. For
example, requiring Treasury to adhere to congressional mandates as
contemplated here may reduce dynamism and flexibility to adjust to
changing circumstances, because congressional control is carried out
through the legislative process. Perhaps if Congress legislated in
broad delegations, Treasury could be more responsive to changing cir-
cumstances, and maybe broad delegations would lead to a less com-
plex scheme of tax regulations.179
IV. WHAT ABOUT NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING?
Arguments that administrative agencies should yield to Congress
have been around for a long time under the auspices of the nondele-
gation doctrine; a regular retort to nondelegation critiques is that the
notice-and-comment process (or something like it) is preferable to
congressional control on normative grounds.so The argument is that
177 Indeed, the IRS regularly includes committee reports based on JCT explanations in
the Internal Revenue Bulletin, a regular publication featuring guidance (mostly produced
by Treasury and the IRS) on tax laws and procedures. IRS Online Bulletins, https://
www.irs.gov/irb (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
178 But see Hines & Logue, note 69 (arguing that Congress should insulate tax policy
from political winds by making broader delegations of taxing authority).
179 Or maybe not. Some scholars have critiqued the tax legislative process as
gridlocked. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic & Political
Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity 86-87 (2000); Doran, note 169, at 556-57.
180 See notes 72-74; see also Hickman & Thomson, note 49, at 308 ("Providing for direct,
meaningful public involvement through prepromulgation notice and comment procedures
inserts an element of democracy into the rulemaking process and thereby legitimates re-
sulting rules.").
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the notice-and-comment process is a mechanism for establishing polit-
ical accountability as a check on agency decision making, and for stim-
ulating information for agency experts to use in shaping regulatory
policies.181 Advocates of interest group models-that is, forms of ad-
ministrative decision making that rely on input from stakeholders-
argue that "[t]he best way to constrain discretion is to encourage com-
petition among interest groups in rule making."'
1 82 But achieving
those normative benefits through notice and comment is not guaran-
teed-it demands robust and diverse participation in the process,
which appears to be lacking in tax rulemaking, as discussed below.
This Part provides an empirical snapshot-the first in the post-
Mayo era-of the participants in notice-and-comment processes for
tax regulations.183 This data analysis reveals that notice and comment
for tax regulations has not elicited broad or diverse input, and thus has
not been a forum for soliciting reliable information for Treasury ex-
perts to rely on in shaping tax regulations. Rather, there often has
been very close to zero participation in most notice-and-comment
processes. Further, the data show that the few participants have been
heavily weighted towards private interests, often sophisticated busi-
ness taxpayers seeking to reduce tax liability in ways that were wholly
predictable and anticipated when Congress addressed the issue.
In order to understand who participates in the notice-and-comment
process, I reviewed all of Treasury's proposed tax regulations from
2013, 2014, and 2015, and analyzed who commented on each, with par-
ticular attention to comments submitted by organized interest groups.
The findings are summarized in Table 1, below. The analysis of each
proposed regulation and commenter is described in further detail in
Appendix I, and each proposed regulation included in this study is
summarized in Appendix II.
181 See Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm "With Teeth": Heightened Judicial Review in
the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1589, 1591 (2014) (describing the
information-producing function of administrative procedures).
182 See Freeman, note 67, at 18. Freeman does not subscribe to this argument, noting
that it relies on the unquestioned assumption that agency discretion should be constrained.
See id.
183 Hickman conducted a study of the substantive focus of tax regulations to shed light
on the extent to which the regulations are focused on tasks other than raising revenue; this
study covered regulatory activity before and after Mayo, and did not include analysis of
who participates in the notice-and-comment process. Hickman, note 9.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
218 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:
TABLE 1
Number of Comments Received on Proposed Tax
Regulations, 2013-2015
Number
Category of Total Mean Median ModeProposed Number of Number of Number of Number of
Rules Comments Comments Comments Comments Range









Who Commented on Proposed Rules Receiving 500 or
Fewer Comments, 2013-2015
Private Private Public
Interesttm4  Individual85  Interest186  Government"8
Total Comments 733 543 137 127
Share of Total 47.6% 35.2% 8.9% 8.2%
Mean (comments 54 1.4 1.3
per project)
Median 2.5 0 0 0
Mode 0 0 0 0
(35 instances) (58 instances) (81 instances) (86 instances)
Range 0-74 0-144 0-57 0-58
184 Private interests consist of taxpayer organizations (for example, business entities)
who are directly affected by a proposed rule, or their representatives. See Appendix I.
185 Private individuals consist of individuals, who often are taxpayers affected by a pro-
posed rule, and although they are interested citizens not directly affected by a proposed
rule.
186 Public interest consist of nongovernmental organizations with public interest mis-
sions, educational or policy organizations (or individuals affiliated with such organiza-
tions), and general membership advocacy organizations, among other categories, and
persons affiliated with such organizations. As described in further detail in Appendix I,
lawyers' groups like the American Bar Association have been categorized as public inter-
est group submissions or private interest group submissions based on the substantive con-
tent of the comment (often these comments align with client interests). See note 235
(discussing the categorization of the American Bar Association).
187 Government includes members of Congress, state and local elected representatives,
and officials from federal, state, and local units of government; some are publicly inter-
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In tax rulemaking, most proposed rules received very few com-
ments. Over the three-year period, only six proposed rules, 5.6% of
the total, received more than 500 comments, whereas 76% of pro-
posed rules received twenty or fewer comments. Of six high-comment
proposed regulations, three dealt with nontax rules, that is, addressed
regulation of behavior that was not really related to the core Code
function of raising revenUe.'88
As elaborated in Table 2, in the other 95% of proposed rules more
than one quarter received zero comments, and the median rule re-
ceived just three comments. Further, the commenters were heavily
weighted towards private interests. Almost half of all comments were
submitted by taxpayer organizations (for example, business entities or
trade groups) that were directly affected by a proposed rule, or repre-
sentatives of these organizations. These types of organizations partici-
pated in 65% of the rulemakings (65 out of 100, and 71 out of 106
overall).189
On the other hand, public interest groups-nongovernmental orga-
nizations with public interest missions, educational or policy organiza-
tions (or individuals affiliated with such organizations), and general
membership advocacy organizations, among other categories, and per-
sons affiliated with such organizations-participated in just 19% of
rulemakings receiving 500 or fewer comments (19 out of 100), and
24% overall (25 out of 106). These organizations submitted 8.9% of
all comments, but those comments were not evenly distributed: 91 out
of the 137 total public interest comments were submitted in response
to two proposed rules. One of those rules was a proposal to allow
states to set up tax-free accounts to benefit disabled individuals, which
prompted comments from a number of disability rights advocacy orga-
nizations.19° The other rule dealt with rules for hospitals to assess
"community health needs" under the Affordable Care Act.191 Re-
moving those two rules from consideration, public interest groups sub-
mitted just 3.5% of the comments on the other proposed regulations
ested, and some are addressing rules that affect a particular constituent group or govern-
ment operations. See Appendix I.
188 Tax rules that relate to raising revenue might define the tax base, facilitate the re-
porting of income, or establish rules to prevent the avoidance of tax liability. In contrast,
the three proposed rules referenced above dealt with (1) regulating political activities of
social welfare organizations, Prop. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1; (2) regulating multi-employer pen-
sion plans, Prop. Reg. § 1.432(e)(9)-1 (2015); and (3) establishing health coverage require-
ments for the employer mandate penalty enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act, Prop.
Reg. § 54.4980H-1 to H-6 (2013).
189 Although I did not tally the total numbers of participants for projects receiving over
500 comments, I spot checked and confirmed that different categories of potential partici-
pants did in fact take part in the notice-and-comment process for each project.
190 Prop. Reg. § 1.529A.
191 Prop. Reg. § 1.501(r) (2013).
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(ninety-eight proposed regulations in total). Thus, the bulk of com-
ments from public interest groups addressed regulations that are unre-
lated to the core Code function of raising revenue; these public
interest groups were nearly totally absent from commenting on sub-
stantive tax regulations.
Scholars have found-and expressed concerns about-low public
interest participation in rulemaking undertaken by other agencies.
For example, a study of EPA air pollution regulations found that pub-
lic interest groups submitted 4% of comments and participated in
48% of notice-and-comment processes.192 A study of forty rules pro-
posed by the Department of Labor and the Department of Transpor-
tation found that public interest groups submitted 6% of comments.
193
Other studies have made similar findings.
194
In general most ax rulemaking appears to have very low salience
with public interest groups, which sets up a dynamic that James Q.
Wilson anticipated in his theoretical work on group dynamics in regu-
latory government.95 Wilson divides the "politics of regulation" into
a four-part typology based on whether the policy has diffuse or con-
centrated costs and benefits.196 He predicts imbalanced participation
in the regulatory process when there are concentrated costs and dif-
fuse benefits.97 Traditional tax rulemaking-oriented towards raising
revenue-fosters an imbalanced group dynamic on both sides of the
ledger. On one side, small groups can face enormous potential costs,
192 Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Em-
pirical Study of EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 99, 128-29 (2011)
(in contrast, industry interests submitted 81% of comments).
193 Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. Pol. 128, 133 (2006) (noting that
industry interests submitted over 57% of comments).
194 For example, another study examined the participants in the notice-and-comment
process for eleven rules total, three issued by the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, three by the EPA, and five by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion in the early 1990's. It found that of the rules with more than one comment, 50% of
rules elicited a public interest group commenter, and public interest groups constituted
4.8% of all comments. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Pro-
cess: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 245,
251, 253-55, exhibits 2A-C (1998). Mariano-Florentino Cud1lar's case study of three pro-
posed rules-one addressing privacy of financial information proposed by Treasury's Fi-
nancial Crimes Enforcement Network, one issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and one issued by the Federal Election Commission-found no public interest commenters
for the financial privacy rule, a result that was replicated many times over in the regula-
tions reviewed in the study for this Article. Mariano-Florentino Cu~llar, Rethinking Regu-
latory Democracy, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 411, 443 (2005); see notes 203-204, and
accompanying text (discussing new public interest groups focused on financial regulations).
195 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in The Politics of Regulation 357 (James
Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
196 Id. at 367-71.
197 Id. at 370.
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and can have homogenous interests; for example, businesses in a par-
ticular industry or using similar tax planning techniques will be af-
fected by proposed rules in the same ways (and businesses already
constitute a form of organized interest). This is typical of regulation
that adversely affects any business interest (for example, environmen-
tal regulations or financial industry regulations). On the other side,
the parties that stand to benefit from other taxpayers' funding of gov-
ernment operations are extremely diffuse, in a way that sets revenue
raising apart from other regulatory pursuits (at least in degree, if not
in kind).198 The interests that come to bear in tax rulemaking are dis-
cussed in further detail below.199
Because of the enormous monetary value of some of these tax regu-
lations to distinct taxpayers, the incentives are such that any rational
taxpayer should be willing to spend vast sums to change or defeat a
proposed regulation. Rationality in the tax context requires a signifi-
cant degree of sophistication: Taxpayers must engage in tax planning,
which is best done using advisors who are experienced with the trans-
actions and structures at issue, and perhaps even using nonpublic in-
formation about how best to structure deals to take advantage of
particular tax rules. And sophisticated taxpayers know that enormous
tax benefits will hinge on highly technical interpretations of the Code.
For example, in the recent Dominion Resources case, a regulation (re-
quiring taxpayers to capitalize a particular cost rather than expense it)
increased a single taxpayer's taxable income by $3.3 million.200 Even
more extreme examples arise with multinational corporations that
have current tax rates approaching zero for income that is excluded
from the U.S. income tax base (compared to a much higher marginal
tax rate for income that is included in the U.S. income tax base).20 1
To counteract the interests of well-organized groups facing concen-
trated costs, Wilson looks to "[p]olicy entrepreneurs," individuals who
work to galvanize public interest positions despite the coordination
problems of organizing in support of diffuse benefits.20 2 And, indeed,
198 See Susannah Camic Tahk, Public Choice Theory and Earmarked Taxes, 68 Tax L.
Rev. 755, 755, 761-63 (2015) (connecting Wilson's theory to tax policy, and summarizing
that "income tax proceeds go into a pool of general revenues, whose funds benefit the
large and yet diffuse and amorphous U.S. public as a whole. As a result of this arrange-
ment, no particular beneficiary group has an incentive to prevent the tax base from
shrinking .... ").
199 See notes 205-04 and accompanying text.
200 Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The
taxpayer successfully challenged the regulation at issue. See id. at 1319 (stating that the
regulation was invalid).
201 See Richard Rubin, Alphabet Is in Line as Winner in IRS Case, Wall St. J., Feb. 29,
2016, at B6 (stating that Google could gain $3.5 billion in an international tax dispute with
the IRS); see also note 206 and accompanying text.
202 Wilson, note 195, at 370.
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it seems possible that interest groups could emerge in the tax rulemak-
ing context. This is precisely what has occurred in recent years with
financial regulations: Commentators had anticipated that financial
regulations (like tax regulations) might have particularly low interest
group participation, but the response to Dodd-Frank regulations gives
"reason to believe that new mobilization forces could alter the status
quo. '20 3 Two public interest groups in particular-Better Markets
Inc. and Americans for Financial Reform-have taken an active role
in financial regulation rulemaking, submitting well over 100 comment
letters each on proposed rules since 2012.204 But there are no ana-
logues to these organizations to be found in tax rulemaking processes,
meaning that there are no groups that frequently and consistently sub-
mit public interest comments that are substantively sophisticated and
benefit from familiarity with all the tax benefits to be derived from
structuring details to benefit from specific tax rules.
As between current and future taxpayers, taxes are a zero-sum
game: A failure to raise revenue currently implies a tax increase on
future taxpayers.20 5 However, future taxpayers are particularly poorly
positioned to have organized groups representing their interests. To
use the Altera case as an example, if opponents of the regulation pre-
vail (meaning that the Tax Court's holding is affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit), the government will lose approximately $3.5 billion in tax
collections from prior tax years from Google alone.2°6 That would
mean that the government would have to come up with an additional
$3.5 billion (and much more when lost revenue from other taxpayers
is considered) to fund its future operations. But the ultimate bearer of
203 Sharkey, note 181, at 1649 n.259. While the author stated that financial regulations,
like tax regulations, were unlikely to elicit a diversity of viewpoints through the notice-and-
comment process, she described as a counterexample a 300-page public interest group sub-
mission in response to the SEC's proposed Volcker Rule in 2012, prepared by a newly-
formed group called Occupy the SEC. Id.; see Occupy the SEC, Comment Letter, Prohibi-
tions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in and Relationships
with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (Jan. 13, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-41-11/s74111-230.pdf.
204 See Better Markets, http://www.bettermarkets.com/rulemaking (last visited Nov. 14,
2017) (listing Better Markets Inc.'s comment letters); Americans for Financial Reform,
ourfinancialsecurity.org/category/regulatory-comment-letters/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2017)
(listing Americans for Financial Reform's comment letters to regulators).
205 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in
the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1157, 1176 (2004) ("[T]ax cuts are not
simply a matter of returning unneeded or unused funds to taxpayers. Tax cuts represent a
choice by current voters either (1) to require future taxpayers to pay for current spending,
or (2) to cut spending."); Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administra-
tion's Policy of Cutting Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1285,
1334 (2004).
206 Rubin, note 201; see Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 91 (2015), appeal dock-
eted, Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497 (9th Cir., argued on Oct. 11, 2017).
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liabilities for debt accrued now is determined by future tax policy deci-
sions. Therefore, when an attempt to raise revenue currently is de-
railed, it is unknown who will actually bear the burden in the future.
Further, future taxpayers are even less well-suited to be represented
currently than are diffuse future interests in other policy areas. This
dynamic sets tax rulemaking apart from financial regulations and
other typical regulations, and makes the notice-and-comment process
for tax rulemaking especially prone to a dearth of public interest
group participation. Consider two alternative regulations that would
cost a large financial institution $100 million per year. The first regu-
lation would increase the financial institution's cost of capital by limit-
ing the amount of leverage the bank can take on. The second
regulation would levy a flat tax on the financial institution. One
would expect that the financial institution will oppose-equally vehe-
mently-the alternative regulations. With the financial regulation, or-
ganized public interest groups might naturally represent the interests
of both current and future citizens: Consumer-oriented regulation
adopted today (protecting the stability of financial markets) may con-
fer benefits on current consumers and on future consumers.
But with the tax regulations, the connection between current and
future interests is more attenuated, and it makes less sense for interest
groups focused on current taxpayers also to take up the mantle of
future taxpayers. Other current taxpayers will not immediately foot
the bill if the financial institution defeats the regulation; instead, the
liability will be borne by future taxpayers, based on future tax policy
decisions. Thus, unlike the financial regulation, with the tax regula-
tion there is not an immediate beneficiary, even a diffuse one.20 7 In-
stead, the trade-off implicates the interest of future taxpayers who do
not have any natural allies in the current regulatory process because
they have interests that diverge from similarly situated current taxpay-
ers. Moreover, the future taxpayers who will actually have increased
taxes are unidentifiable when the notice-and-comment process takes
place, because future tax liability generally depends on future deci-
sions by Congress.208
207 There is a degree of path dependence in tax policy: Tax policy decisions today be-
come existing tax policies for tomorrow, which suggests that raising revenue from future
taxpayers requires raising revenue currently from similarly situated taxpayers. As dis-
cussed further in Section IV, the rulemaking process is not set up to confront these sorts of
trade-offs. Subsection Ii.B..1. argues that Congress is better suited to this task.
20 There are other barriers to publicly interested participation in Treasury's tax poli-
cymaking as well. For one, Treasury can abstain from enforcing laws, and typically has
done so in ways that reduce tax collections (thus imposing a burden on other or future
taxpayers). See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administra-
tion of the Income Tax, 62 Duke L.J. 829, 834 (2012); Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Cate-
gorical Nonenforcement, 69 Tax L. Rev. 73, 85 (2015). A second barrier is limits on
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Another important feature of the archetype notice-and-comment
process is also missing from responses to many proposed tax regula-
tions: These rules often do not seem to prompt useful data or insights
to inform the rulemaking process. This conclusion is anecdotal, but it
was exceedingly rare for taxpayers to provide actual information
about the rule. More commonly, taxpayers describe the effects of a
rule, but often when industry groups were opposed to a proposal, the
descriptions were transparently in the service of avoiding higher tax
liability. For example, in the regulation at issue in the Altera case,
organizations representing Altera and other similarly situated taxpay-
ers submitted thirteen comments, all of which opposed the propo-
sal.209 The thirteen private comments focused on statutory and
regulatory interpretation,210 clearly aimed at defeating a proposal that
would cost the affected parties significant money. No public interest
groups participated.
The survey presented here shows that, over a recent three-year pe-
riod the notice-and-comment process did not elicit broad and diverse
participation for most tax rulemaking. The dynamics explored above
suggest that the lack of diversity of perspectives observed in the no-
tice-and-comment process for almost all tax regulations is indicative of
an endemic challenge in tax rulemaking. The skewed levels of partici-
pation as between private interests and public interests is rooted in the
organizational capacities of the parties (sophisticated taxpayers on the
one hand, facing off against diffuse future taxpayers). Further, to the
extent that the notice-and-comment process is producing information
that is used by Treasury personnel to inform tax regulations, they may
be ending up with a "lopsided view of the universe. 211 And very
often, the process produces so few substantive comments that it can-
not be a useful source of information or a useful gauge of stakeholder
preferences. Thus, the notice-and-comment process is most often a
poor mechanism for achieving key normative goals of administrative
law in the tax regulatory process.
This Part explores what congressional control of tax rulemaking
means for application of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
and judicial review doctrine to tax regulations, and for the broader
taxpayer standing to raise claims in court. While a concentrated interest that is subject to a
tax regulation can challenge the regulation in court (subject to a few limitations, such as
the tax Anti-Injunction Act, see IRC § 7421; notes 40-41 and accompanying text), taxpay-
ers or public interest groups cannot. See Sugin, note 165, at 652 (referring to the burdens
placed on "invisible taxpayers" who are unable to defend their interests in the judicial
process).
209 See Altera, 145 T.C. at 104-06.
210 T.D. 9088, 2003-42 I.R.B. 841 (Oct. 20).
211 Sharkey, note 181, at 1649.
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discourse on political accountability and the balance of power be-
tween Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary in tax poli-
cymaking. I propose adopting a "JCT Canon" for construing
congressional delegations to Treasury. Agency personnel and courts
should construe ambiguous tax provisions to conform to gap-filling
performed by JCT in conjunction with its role in the tax legislative
process-helping formulate and draft bills, and producing revenue
and distributional estimates-as memorialized in JCT explanations
that are incorporated in legislative history.
The JCT Canon is related to and similar to the recently introduced
CBO Canon.2 12 Under the JCT Canon, courts (and Treasury and IRS
personnel) should construe ambiguous tax statutes in the same man-
ner as the JCT did in producing revenue estimates and other analysis
and explanations for the statute. Like the CBO Canon, this interpre-
tive tool has "democratic bona fides" in that JCT analysis has been
generated-and required-by Congress itself, and that analysis is
front and center in congressional debates about proposed legisla-
tion.213 And, as discussed in Section III.A, the JCT goes a step be-
yond the CBO by actually producing technical explanations of tax
provisions, which serve to inform revenue estimates and become a
part of the legislative history for enacted bills. In this respect, the JCT
Canon may be even more useful for construing tax statutes than is the
CBO Canon for other types of legislation, because the interpretive
conclusion is publicly memorialized contemporaneously by the JCT
staff.
The JCT Canon actually reflects an important practice that is cen-
tral to federal tax administration: Taxpayers and their advisors fre-
quently rely on JCT-produced legislative history to construe tax
statutes and to anticipate future Treasury regulations. Longstanding
Treasury regulations that govern how tax penalties are determined
and how taxpayers may protect against certain penalties explicitly al-
low that taxpayers may look to "congressional intent as reflected in
committee reports, joint explanatory statements of managers included
in conference committee reports, and floor statements made prior to
enactment by one of a bill's managers; General Explanations of tax
legislation prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation (the Blue
Book). '214 Taxpayer-driven statutory interpretation is especially im-
portant given the system of self-assessment that underlies federal in-
212 The CBO Canon is "the concept that ambiguous statutes should be interpreted in
accordance with the reading of the statute adopted by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) in calculating its budgetary impact." Gluck, note 110, at 182.
213 Id. at 188.
214 Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
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come taxation, and it is common practice to place significant emphasis
on JCT insights and construction.
As a matter of statutory interpretation by courts, it may only be
necessary to apply the JCT Canon in instances where the statutory
language is ambiguous. Thus, when the congressional control model
has produced a highly detailed statute that limits Treasury's rulemak-
ing discretion even without regard to legislative history, the JCT Ca-
non should not be relevant. However, in instances where the JCT-
produced legislative history clarifies or informs the specific meaning
of a statute, and, as is often the case, directs the substance of tax regu-
lations, the JCT Canon will prove important. It also suggests a simple
method for distinguishing certain tax legislative history from run-of-
the-mill legislative history that does not necessarily provide demo-
cratic legitimacy in the same manner-for example, committee state-
ments, colloquies, and so on.
215
As suggested by the recent introduction of the CBO Canon by
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman, scholars have begun to explore the
implications of the legislative process on rulemaking and accountabil-
ity, suggesting that the realities of how Congress and agencies interact
should be reflected in statutory interpretation.216 To the extent that
the characteristics of tax legislating that contribute to congressional
control are not limited to tax-or need not be: Congress could limit
the breadth of its delegations in other areas of law-the JCT Canon
and focus on Congress in the regulatory process could have broader
applicability. To that point, interpretation of regulations has received
significant scholarly attention recently.
217
There is extensive debate about the types of authorities judges
should consult in construing statutes, including the extent to which it
is appropriate to rely on legislative history at either step one or step
two of Chevron (which connects to State Farm because courts and
scholars are currently deliberating whether State Farm review is neces-
sarily part of Chevron step two, that is, whether satisfying the rea-
215 There are many familiar critiques to judicial reliance on legislative history that I do
not fully delve into here. See, e.g., Manning, note 106 (examining the textualist's view of
legislative intent in the legislative process).
216 Bressman & Gluck, note 84, at 764; see, e.g., Gluck, note 110, at 182 (elaborating on
the CBO Canon and congressional-process ba ed perspectives on statutory interpretation);
Bressman & Gluck, note 84, at 969; Gluck et al., note 111, at 1839-44. Long before Mayo,
Michael Livingston addressed some particulars of statutory interpretation and the use of
legislative history to interpret tax statutes. See Livingston, note 100, at 833-35; Michael
Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 Tax
L. Rev. 677, 678-79 (1996).
217 Compare Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 355 (2012)
(arguing for purposive interpretation of regulations), with Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textu-
alism, 65 Duke L.J. 81 (2015) (arguing for textualist interpretation of regulations).
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soned decisionmaking standard is necessary in order for courts to
defer to agency action under Chevron).218 The value of legislative his-
tory is discounted by some because it is not part of and subject to the
constitutional enactment process, or it may be a means for judges to
increase their discretion, or it may not reflect Congress' understanding
of the statute, or it may be subject to manipulation.219 In short, legis-
lative history is suspect because in various ways it is an unreliable way
to discern congressional intent.
But the process for producing legislative history for delegations of
tax authority should allay some of these concerns. The production of
legislative history in conjunction with tax delegations of authority is
interwoven with the enactment process and with the production of
revenue estimates.220 Because committee reports are regularly de-
rived from the explanations that the JCT has prepared in connection
with revenue estimates and as part of the legislative process, this form
of legislative history provides reliable insight as to Congress' under-
standing of the legislation when enacted. Thus, legislative history pro-
duced for tax legislation (in addition to being explicit and specific221)
can be more reliable-that is, a good indicator of how members of
Congress resolved and understood various issues-for construing tax
delegations of regulatory authority than is legislative history for other
types of regulatory delegations.
The JCT Canon is especially important following Mayo because
now, for the first time, courts are expected regularly to apply general
administrative law precedents to judicial review of tax regulations.
222
Scholars have viewed this as potentially disruptive to tax administra-
tion, because almost all tax regulations were drafted prior to Mayo, at
a time when Treasury, courts, and taxpayers did not understand that
all elements of the APA and general administrative law precedent
might apply to tax rulemaking.223 A key issue in judicial review of
previously issued tax regulations is Treasury's decisionmaking process,
218 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); Jerry L. Mashaw, Richard A. Merrill, Peter M. Shane, M. Elizabeth Magill, Mari-
ano-Florentino Cud11ar & Nicholas R. Parrillo, Administrative Law: The American Public
Law System 1011-12 (7th ed. 2014) ("[A] majority of the Court has occasionally been
willing to find lack of clarity, not only by looking at legislative and statutory history, but by
implicitly inverting the Chevron steps to consider Step 2 as a way of understanding whether
there is clarity at Step 1."); note 30; note 27 (outlining the Chevron two-step analysis).
219 See Katzmann, note 106, at 40-42 (summarizing textualists' critiques of legislative
history).
220 See Subsection III.A.3.
221 See id.
222 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011); Sec-
tions II.A and II.B.
223 See note 48 and accompanying text.
Imaged with the permission of Tax Law Review of New York University School of Law
2272017]
analyzed under State Farm's "reasoned decision making" standard.224
In State Farm the Court indicated that an agency decision would be
arbitrary and capricious either if it "relied on factors which Congress
has not intended it to consider" or if it "runs counter to the evidence
before the agency.' 225 If a reviewing court can determine that the
content of a tax regulation was directed by Congress, and Treasury has
construed the statute via regulation as directed through a detailed
statute scheme or through explicit legislative history, that should be
sufficient to satisfy the "relevant factors" inquiry of State Farm review.
For example, in Altera the regulation followed a congressional di-
rective communicated via legislative history, but organizations repre-
senting Altera and other similarly situated taxpayers submitted
thirteen comments, all of which opposed the proposal.226 The com-
ments included evidence (of questionable relevance) that Treasury's
position was inconsistent with other regulations (regulations that,
while similar, were not the subject of the same congressional direc-
tive). Treasury's final regulation either had to contradict the congres-
sional directive, or contradict the "evidence" submitted during the
notice-and-comment process. The Tax Court held that Treasury's ex-
planation based on legislative history was inadequate because Trea-
sury did not respond extensively to the comments it received.227
Under the JCT Canon, the legislative history providing a congres-
sional directive could be given greater emphasis, and Treasury would
not be required to build an administrative record defending against
comments where Congress contemplated the issue during the legisla-
tive process and limited Treasury's discretion. This approach would
224 The government appears to be concerned about State Farm review: Recently the
IRS has taken the position in litigation that "[w]here an agency rule does not require fact-
finding or empirical analysis, the data-based factors under State Farm do not apply." Brief
for Respondent at 18, 3M Co. v. Commissioner, No. 5816-13 (T.C. June 29, 2016); see also
note 30 (describing the Supreme Court's recent opinions addressing the extent to which
State Farm is integrated with Chevron step two).
225 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983); notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Recall that under State Farm, an agency rule
must be "rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors." State Farm, 463 U.S. at
42. The Court explained that
[n]ormally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausi-
ble that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.
Id. at 43; cf. note 46 (describing the Tax Court's holding that Treasury failed to meet each
of these requirements when it promulgated the regulation at issue in Altera).
226 Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. 91, 104-06 (2015), appeal docketed, Nos. 16-
70496, 16-70497 (9th Cir., argued on Oct. 11, 2017); notes 148-52.
227 Altera, 145 T.C. at 130.
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allow for Chevron deference only when Treasury has engaged in the
notice-and-comment process and adhered to the understanding of the
provision developed by the JCT contemporaneous with enactment-
even if some other aspects of "reasoned decision making" appear to
be wanting-recognizing that Congress has directed Treasury's (or
some other agency's) decisionmaking process.
228
For regulations that Treasury proposes in the future, an approach to
judicial review under State Farm that relies on the JCT Canon (and
thus on legislative history) means that Treasury should be mindful in
its preambles to explain the basis for the rule in terms of the statute
and legislative history, and particularly to indicate when Congress
used JCT analysis in the legislative process to limit the range of poli-
cymaking discretion granted to Treasury. This would constitute only a
minor shift in emphasis for Treasury's practices for undertaking the
notice-and-comment process and drafting preambles. As traditionally
composed, preambles to tax regulations are an important tool for
helping taxpayers understand the purpose and potential applications
of tax regulations. Treasury has recently indicated that it will begin
drafting its preambles with State Farm in mind.229 It is unclear what
precisely this change will entail: An approach modeled on other areas
of law might place greater emphasis on building an administrative re-
cord with evidence to respond to comments. But if Treasury's pream-
bles become the sort of adversarial litigation documents that agencies
produce to defend other types regulations, it might undermine the
utility of preambles for taxpayers and tax practitioners seeking to un-
derstand a statute and regulations.
230
For existing regulations, the JCT Canon would provide some stabil-
ity in the tax system: Courts reviewing regulations that predate Mayo
should interpret regulations in a manner that is consistent with State
228 Some recent challenges to Treasury regulations indicate that judicial review still has
bite even if a court considers only whether Treasury acted within the authority delegated
by Congress. In two opinions since Mayo, courts have held against the government in
disputes regarding regulations as matters of statutory interpretation. United States v.
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 489-90 (2012) (holding invalid a Treasury
regulation because Congress had directly spoken to the question at hand); Dominion Re-
sources v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the statute
and legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend to allow the regulation as
promulgated by Treasury). These opinions both side-step the issues that courts confront
under State Farm, although had these cases commenced after Mayo it seems likely that the
taxpayers would have included claims of procedural deficiencies under State Farm. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Respondents, United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478 (2012) (No. 11-139), http:/pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1989098.
29 See Ryan Finley, Changes to Foreign Goodwill Rules Will Steer Clear of Altera, 152
Tax Notes 498 (July 25, 2016).
2m See Shaviro, note 12.
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Farm, but also consistent with Treasury practices that generally reflect
attentiveness to the legislative process and the existence and role of
the JCT. Where Treasury has failed to construe statutes consistent
with JCT interpretations and has not otherwise provided a satisfactory
justification for an existing rule, courts should invalidate regulations
or-especially for regulations that predate Mayo-direct Treasury to
explain its position more thoroughly (an extraordinary action that
could be justified by the interest of stability in tax administration).231
This connects to a related issue: How should Treasury and courts
approach tax regulations that do not feature the hallmarks of congres-
sional control? For example, § 385 provides broad authority for regu-
lations that distinguish between debt and equity, and Congress
provided very little substantive guidance about how this authority
might be wielded.232 Where tax statutes consist of broad delegations
to Treasury to set policy via regulation with little substantive guidance
from Congress, the existence of the JCT has no bearing on Treasury's
course of action, nor on judicial review of resultant regulations. In
these instances, there will likely be a true lack of political accountabil-
ity in most instances, with the notice-and-comment process yielding
zero or very little participation. The congressional control model
presented in this Article does not provide guidance for how to treat
these other regulations, but the issue requires further consideration.
VI. Conclusion
At this important moment for tax administration, this Article makes
the case that Congress has special capacity to control tax rulemaking
by limiting Treasury's policymaking discretion through detailed statu-
tory directives and explicit legislative history. The congressional con-
trol model described here helps avoid potentially disruptive
consequences presented by other avenues for assimilating tax
rulemaking with general administrative law. And congressional con-
trol fosters political accountability, allows for appropriate reliance on
expertise in the policymaking process, and provides certainty for tax-
payers. By recognizing Congress' capacity for preemptive gap filling,
the JCT Canon would integrate the congressional control model with
existing judicial review doctrine. Thus, congressional control of tax
231 1 am suggesting that some form of remand without vacatur would be appropriate,
although the manner in which this remedy might map onto judicial review of tax regula-
tions deserves further attention.
232 The Obama administration used § 385 authority to limit the benefits that corpora-
tions can derive from so-called inversion transactions, a context that Congress certainly did
not anticipate when it enacted § 385 in 1969. See Prop. Reg. § 1.385-1, -2, -3; S. Rep. No.
91-552, at 137-39, reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423.
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rulemaking is consistent with the "principles" of general administra-
tive law that the Supreme Court emphasized in Mayo, and responds to
the Court's request for justifications, grounded in administrative law,
for taking a particularized approach to administrative review of tax
law.




EXPLANATION OF RULEMAKING STUDY
The analysis of notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) under-
taken for this Article consisted of the following: With the help of a
research assistant, I reviewed each tax-related notice of proposed
rulemaking issued by Treasury in 2013, 2014, and 2015, covering a to-
tal of 106 distinct rulemaking projects, each of which is described in
Appendix 11.233 Six projects elicited so many comments that I could
not complete full analysis of the participants in those notice-and-com-
ment processes. For each other NPRM, I categorized the substance of
the proposed rule, categorized the identity of each commenter, and
tallied the number of each type of commenter.
I categorized each comment submitted during the notice-and-com-
ment process by commentator type as follows:
0 Private interests, which consist of taxpayers (or their representa-
tives) who are directly affected by a proposed rule, for example bus-
iness entities that expect to pay additional tax, or persons or groups
advocating on behalf of such entities. This category includes busi-
nesses, organizations with limited membership and specific subject
interests, and trade organizations (for example, chambers of com-
merce, or industry-specific groups).
* Public interests, which consist of nongovernmental organizations
with public interest missions, including policy organizations, think
tanks, general membership advocacy organizations, and charitable
organizations commenting as part of their public interest missions
(that is, not in relation to their own tax liability). 234
0 Private individuals, which includes persons who submit reac-
tions to the rule or sign petitions joining a comment on a rule (al-
though petition signatures and form submissions are aggregated
where possible). Note that the individual comments submitted in
233 Using regulations.gov, I initially reviewed 171 docket folders identified as tax-related
"proposed rules." Some items identified as proposed rules did not include actual NPRMs
(for example, some of these docket folders contained notices that solicited input in ad-
vance of drafting a proposed rule). My initial review yielded 119 NPRMs, which consisted
of 106 distinct regulatory projects (several projects involved more than one NPRM, so for
purposes of this analysis, comments addressing the same substantive rule but split among
multiple NPRMs are aggregated to a single project). Each distinct regulatory project is
identified in Appendix II by an eight-character Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) as
used on regulations.gov, which for rules administered by the IRS (that is, all the rules
analyzed here) begins with 1545. A few NPRMs were not assigned an RIN, in which case
they are identified by the IRS docket number, which consists of "IRS-" followed by an
eight-digit number.
234 Cf. Cullar, note 194, at 434 (distinguishing public interest participants in a similar
manner in a study of participants in notice-and-comment processes).
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response to tax NPRMs affecting corporations are almost univer-
sally not substantive (and very often even incoherent).
0 Government, including members of Congress, state and local
elected representatives, and state or local government departments
or enterprises that have administrative obligations in connection
with a tax measure (for example, Affordable Care Act provisions),
or have an interest in the matter directly (for example, rules related
to tax-exempt bonds).
Comments submitted by the American Bar Association and similar
lawyers' groups are categorized as either private interest or public in-
terest depending on the content of submission.
235
235 Despite often including disclaimers stating that lawyers who contribute to these com-
ment letters are not working on behalf of any client, it appears to me that comments sub-
mitted by ABA-type groups often align with client interests. In some ways this makes
sense: One would not expect lawyers who generally work on behalf of power plants to
submit comments supporting environmental regulations detrimental to those clients, for
example. But this bears further consideration, because these comments-and some of the
comments provided by private interest groups-provide very useful insights and sugges-
tions for technical corrections that Treasury often uncontroversially heeds. Cf. Michael
Asimov, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 Tax Law.
343, 366 (1991) (distinguishing the virtues of political accountability that result from the
notice-and-comment process from the practical purpose of creating "better rules."). Of the
twenty-six comments submitted by ABA-type groups in total over the three-year study, ten
of those comments were publicly interested in substance, and sixteen comments were pro-
moting private interests.
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APPENDIX II
SUMMARY OF NPRMs REVIEWED
The table that follows summarizes all of the NPRMs reviewed in
this study. Each entry in this Appendix includes a brief description of
the purpose of the provision, and the number of each type of
commenter.
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